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THE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL REQUIREMENT
IN U.S. AND EUROPEAN UNION AIR LAW




T HE NATURE of international trade has significantly
changed over the last decades. Government-imposed barri-
ers to the free trade of goods and services have been reduced,
and that has contributed to the development of a unified global
market economy. Considering the increasing importance of ser-
vices, many nations are trying to enhance their participation in
the free trade of services, particularly in the international air
services market.
For decades, many countries owned and controlled their na-
tional airlines, mainly for reasons of national prestige and secur-
ity. They viewed their "national air carriers" as vital to their
national economic interests and, consequently, they supported
and sustained their aviation industry. Many states maintained
state-owned carriers that operated unprofitably and required
subsidization. In order to protect national airlines, many coun-
tries were reluctant to open their domestic commercial air
routes to foreign competition. However, more and more Euro-
pean countries have begun wholly or partially to privatize their
national carriers1 and to liberalize their markets. Similarly, the
United States deregulated its domestic air transportation market
* The author is an attorney (Rechtsanwalt) with the law firm Freshfields
Bruckhaus Deringer in Munich. The article was written in the course of the
Graduate Seminar "International Transportation Law" by Prof. Alan Mendelsohn
and Prof. Warren Dean at Georgetown University Law Center.
I For example, British Airways and Lufthansa have been completely privatized,
while Air France, Alitalia, Sabena, and Iberia have been partially privatized,
mainly because of the high pressure on state-aids exercised by the European
Commission.
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in 1978 to promote competition and, as a result, to provide bet-
ter services and lower air fares for the American consumers.2
Ownership requirements, often also called citizenship or na-
tionality requirements, refer to two different levels of air trans-
portation, namely domestic air services within a country
("cabotage"' ) and international air carriage. The vast majority
of countries traditionally reserve their respective domestic mar-
ket for national carriers. The United States has maintained
strict foreign investment restrictions on industries that are im-
portant for the infrastructure, such as broadcasting, electric and
nuclear power, as well as aviation and shipping. Similarly, the
European Union ("EU") limits the investments of third coun-
tries in Community carriers. The current international regime
consists of bilateral agreements with the general idea that only
"flag carriers" that are substantially owned and effectively con-
trolled by the designating state and/or its nationals can be des-
ignated to exploit their country's traffic rights.
Despite the worldwide liberalization of the aviation market,
ownership requirements in national laws and bilateral air ser-
vices agreements still remain and present an obstacle to the fur-
ther opening of the aviation markets and, hence, a barrier to
the free flow of international trade. While the rest of the corpo-
rate world pursues cross-border mergers and acquisitions, the
aviation industry is tied up by these decades-old ownership laws
that prevent airlines from merging.
Nevertheless, the international airline community favors the
cooperation of airlines, which could well have an effect on the
nationality of any of the airlines involved in such cooperation.
As long as the international aviation market was dominated by
restrictive bilateral agreements, predetermining capacity and
frequency, ownership requirements did not create any particu-
lar problems. The liberalization and deregulation of the inter-
national air services market, however, allowed the increase of
international competition and the desire of many air carriers to
cooperate with foreign carriers in any given form. The uncer-
tainty created by ownership requirements and nationality
clauses in bilaterals has caused concerns as to whether these
provisions will impede the economic need for liberalization and
2 See Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705
(1978).
3 Cabotage is commonly defined as carriage of passengers or goods between
two points within the territory of same nation for compensation or hire.
690
2001] OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL REQUIREMENT
industry restructuring, namely substantial investments in foreign
carriers and the merger between carriers.4
This article discusses the different ownership and control re-
quirements in the aviation sector in the United States as well as
in the European Union. It gives an overview of the historical
background of ownership and control requirements in interna-
tional aviation. The article then outlines the statutory owner-
ship and control requirements both in the United States and in
the European Union. It particularly focuses on the notion of
'control' in both systems and whether any numerical differences
actually lead to different practical results. The article also ana-
lyzes the external relationships of the United States and the EU
Member States, which are still governed by bilateral air services
agreements and heavily affected by nationality clauses. In its
second part, the article examines the ownership requirements
in U.S. maritime law in order to show potential similarities or
differences between the maritime and aviation legal schemes.
II. AVIATION
A. HisToRIcAL BACKGROUND OF OWNERSHIP REQUIREMENTS
In order to understand ownership requirements and the posi-
tion the United States and the European Union take, it is impor-
tant to be aware of how ownership requirements have emerged
and developed in the legal regime of domestic and international
air services.
1. Chicago Convention
The Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation,
signed in Chicago on December 7, 1944 ("Chicago Conven-
tion"5), established the basic rules for international civil avia-
tion. Article 16 of the Convention established the principle that
"every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air-
space above its territory. ' 7 Article 7 of the Chicago Convention
recognizes that each nation has a right to reserve for its national
4 See H. Peter van Fenema, Ownership Restrictions: Consequences and Steps to be
Taken, 23 AIR & SPACE LAw 63 (1998).
5 Convention on International Civil Aviation, December 7, 1944, 15 U.N.T.S.
295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention]
6 See id. at 296.
7 The principle of sovereignty was already mentioned in the Convention of the
Regulation of Aerial Navigation ("Paris Convention"), Oct. 13, 1919, 11 L.N.T.S.
173.
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airlines the carriage of passengers, mail, or cargo transported
for compensation between two points within its territory. Thus,
each nation may reserve its domestic traffic (cabotage) to do-
mestic carriers. Article 17 of the Chicago Convention attributes
to every aircraft a particular nationality, namely, the nationality
of its place of registry." Although Article 17 does not directly
address the question of who may own aircraft, it makes clear that
the Convention considers commercial air services closely linked
with a particular "home country" that has a particular "flag car-
rier."9 The Chicago Convention thereby implicitly approves a
nation's right to establish citizenship requirements for its
airlines.' °
On the other hand, the Chicago Convention did not establish
an international regulatory body and also did not grant traffic
rights for international scheduled air services. Although certain
rights are contained in the International Air Services Transit
Agreement," there is no multilateral agreement on interna-
tional commercial air traffic rights. The concept of sovereignty
over national airspace established by the Chicago Convention,
therefore, forced the development of a bilateral system, in
which airlines must rely on bilateral agreements to determine
traffic rights, capacity, and frequency of services.
2. Bilateral Agreements
The vast majority of international scheduled flights are regu-
lated by bilateral air transport agreements, 12 which are generally
made by executive agreements, treaties, or exchanges of diplo-
matic notes. In the United States, bilateral air transport agree-
ments have the status of executive agreements, which are signed
8 Article 17 of the Chicago Convention states "aircraft have the nationality of
the State in which they are registered." Chicago Convention, supra note 5, at art.
XVII, 15 U.N.T.S. at 308.
9 SeeJoachim Rosengarten and Klaus-Dieter Stephan, The Licensing of German
Air Carriers in Germany under Regulation 2407/92, 23 AIR & SPACE LAW 67, 133
(1998).
10 Seth Warner, Liberalize Open Skies: Foreign Investment and Cabotage Restrictions
Keep Noncitizens in Second Class, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 277, 306 (1993).
11 International Air Services Transit Agreement, opened for signature Dec. 7,
1944, 84 U.N.T.S. 389 (granting the first and second Freedoms of the Air, the
privilege to fly across over foreign territory without landing and to land for non-
traffic purposes). Today, 100 countries are members of the Agreement. See Ger-
man Federal Gazette (BGB1.) 1998, 11-254.
12 E.g., Germany is party to 110 bilateral air transport agreements, and a simi-
lar number is true for many other countries.
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by the president without requiring congressional ratification.' 3
Bilateral agreements used to follow a model, in particular the
model of the so-called Bermuda Agreement. In 1946, the
United States and the United Kingdom entered into a bilateral
air transport agreement, commonly known as "Bermuda I,""
which for the next 30 years served as the model for the United
States and other countries in negotiating bilateral air transport
agreements. After the United Kingdom denounced Bermuda I
in 1976, a more restrictive agreement between the United States
and the United Kingdom became effective, known as "Bermuda
II"15-which, however, was never as influential as Bermuda I.16
It is a general concept of bilateral agreements that only carri-
ers that are designated by the respective contracting party can
exercise and exploit the traffic rights granted in the bilateral
agreement. In addition, airlines must have a clear national
identity in order to use the traffic rights of a state. Since the
mid-1940s, almost all bilateral air transport agreements, includ-
ing the Bermuda agreements, contain nationality clauses that
follow the model of the LASTA (International Air Services
Transit Agreement), which addressed the issue of airline nation-
ality. It reserves the right of a contracting state to withhold or
revoke the certificate or permit of an airline of another state in
any case where the contracting state "is not satisfied that sub-
stantial ownership and effective control are vested in nationals
of [the other] State."17
Thus, the nationality of the air carrier guarantees that each
state gets, or at least has the possibility to get, its own share of
the market, with no third parties being allowed to benefit from
13 P.P.C. Haanappel, Bilateral Air Transport Agreements - 1913-1980, 5 INT'L
TRADE LJ. 241 264 (1980).
14 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the United Kingdom Relating to Air Services Between Their
Respective Territories, Feb. 11, 1946, U.S.-U.K., 60 Stat. 1499 [hereinafter Ber-
muda I].
15 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the United Kingdom Relating to Air Services Between Their
Respective Territories, July 23, 1977, 28 U.S.T. 5367 [hereinafter Bermuda II].
Bermuda II restricted capacity and significantly reduced U.S. air carriers' fifth-
freedom rights.
16 Basically, bilateral agreements consist of three principles: (1) bilateral ex-
change of traffic rights, (2) rights are only granted on a reciprocal basis, and (3)
fair and equal opportunities for each contracting party.
17 International Air Services Transit Agreement, Dec. 7, 1944, Art. I, § 5, 84
U.N.T.S. 389, 394.
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the bilateral exchange of traffic rights. 18 Therefore, as a general
rule, it is impossible for an air carrier under the currently pre-
vailing bilateral regime to sell a majority of its shares to a foreign
carrier and still qualify as a designated air carrier of its state, or
to buy a majority share of a foreign air carrier and to exploit the
traffic rights of the acquired carrier. The nationality clause es-
tablishes a link between the air carrier using international com-
mercial rights and the state designating these rights, thereby
implementing a balance of benefits and preventing a situation
of non-reciprocal benefits. The practice of entering into bilat-
eral agreements with reciprocal nationality clauses remains cur-
rent.19 As a result of this regime, a situation has emerged where
all major carriers are either state-owned or owned by a majority
of their home country's nationals. Moreover, by adopting bilat-
eral provisions on ownership and control the contracting states
are able to prevent the development of "flags of convenience" in
international air transport, i.e., the registry of an aircraft in a
country with less burdensome regulations, which is very com-
mon in the maritime sector. °
3. Current U.S. Policy
A major task of the Clinton administration is to establish
worldwide open-air transport markets on the basis of Open Skies
agreements. "Open Skies" is a model set of provisions set forth
by the Department of Transportation (DOT), which the United
States currently uses in negotiating bilateral agreements with
other nations.2 1 An Open Skies agreement may provide for
open entry on all routes to the U.S. market and vice versa, un-
restricted capacity and frequency, flexibility in pricing, and
code-sharing opportunities. The United States has incorporated
the elements of its Open Skies concept in several bilateral agree-
ments with members of the European Union, such as the
Netherlands, 22 Germany, 23 Italy24 and Portugal, 25 and is seeking
18 See Henri Wasserbergh, The Regulation of State-Aid in International Air Trans-
port, 22 AIR & SPACE L. 158,160 (1997).
19 An exception is carriers with a multinational ownership, involving owner-
ship by several governments. These are designated as national carriers by the
different countries and accepted as such by those countries that have bilateral
agreements with the owning countries. Examples are Gulf Air, Air Afrique, LIAT,
and SAS, which have a fictitious "Scandinavian" nationality.
20 See infra § VI(A) (2).
21 See In the Matter Defining "Open Skies," D.O.T. Order No. 92-8-13 (1992).
22 See Memorandum of Consultations and Amendments, Sept. 4, 1992, U.S.-
Neth.1 (1992), Air Transport Agreement Between the Government of the United
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to export its deregulation policy worldwide. 6 Since the bilateral
agreements are all based on the DOT's notion of "Open Skies,"
they show a great similarity and, therefore, the U.S.-European
air services market can be described as a relatively unified
27regime.
However, the DOT refused to include provisions in its Open
Skies definition that would promote the liberalization of foreign
investment or cabotage restrictions. It determined that these
matters are governed by statute, which can only be amended by
Congress.28 The reluctance of the United States to relax its own-
ership requirements, i.e. its foreign investment and cabotage
laws, has caused the failure so far of the bilateral negotiation
between the United States and the United Kingdom who have
been unable to reach an Open Skies agreement.
B. OWNERSHIP REQUIREMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES
1. Ownership Requirements in the Cabotage Laws
Despite its efforts to liberalize air services markets generally,
the United States continues both to protect its domestic aviation
industry against significant foreign control and to preclude for-
eign air carriers from obtaining cabotage rights. Congress first
enacted citizenship requirements for U.S. carriers in the Air
Commerce Act of 1926, which provided that an aircraft could be
registered in the U.S. only if owned by U.S. citizens. The Act
States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Apr.
3, 1957, U.S.-Neth., 12 U.S.T. 837.
23 See Protocol between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany to Amend the Air Trans-
port Agreement ofJuly 7, 1955, printed in Dieter Bartkowski andJohn Byerly, Forty
Years of U.S. German Aviation Relations, 46 ZLW 3, 33-45 (1997).
24 See Protocol Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the Italian Republic to Amend the Air Transport Agreement
of June 22, 1970, U.S.-Italy, 21 U.S.T. 2096 (initialed, ad referendum, Nov. 11,
1998).
25 See Press Release, Department of Transportation, United States, Portugal
Conclude Open Skies Agreement (Dec. 23, 1999), available at, <http://www.dot.
gov/affairs/ 1999/dot22099.htm>.
26 As of April 2000, the United States has concluded forty-one Open Skies
agreement . The latest of these agreements was concluded with the Slovak Re-
public. See Department of Transportation, United States, Slovak Republic Reach
First Open Skies Agreement of the 21st Century, Jan. 10, 2000, available at
<http://www.dot.gov/affairs/2000/dot0700.htm>.
27 See Christian Jung, Die Marktordnung des Luftverkehrs - Zeit ffir neue Strukturen
in einem liberalisierten Umfeld, 47 ZLW 499, 500 (1998).
28 See Open Skies, supra note 21, at 12.
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clarified that U.S: citizens must control a minimum of 51% of
the voting interest and that the air carrier's president and at
least two-thirds of the carrier's board members must be U.S. citi-
zens. 29 The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 increased the mini-
mum percentage of voting equity required to be held by U.S.
citizens from 51% to 75%. 3o The Civil Aeronautics Act was
based on the Shipping Act of 1916, which already required 75%
U.S. citizen ownership."
Congress' purpose in limiting foreign investment in U.S. car-
riers was primarily one of national defense. 2 In 1925, Congress
feared that foreign countries could gain control over U.S. air-
lines and use them against the United States. Thus, Congress
included the citizenship requirement in the Air Commerce Act
in order to provide the military with access to commercial air-
craft, which, in the event of a national emergency, could supple-
ment its military aircraft fleet.3 3 A more elaborate program was
set up during the Korean War in 1951, the Civil Reserve Act
Fleet (CRAF) program. 4
After the Depression of the 1930s, another aspect of owner-
ship requirements emerged, and this aspect remained valid un-
til today. Due to the consequences of a largely unregulated
world economy, Congress shifted its economic position from
proposing free trade to reliance on governmental intervention
29 See Air Commerce Act of 1926, ch. 344, § 9(a)(3), 44 Stat. 568 (1926).
30 SeeCivil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 973, § 1(13)(c)
(1938).
31 Shipping Act, ch. 451, 39 Stat. 728, § 2 (1916) (codified as amended at 46
U.S.C. § 802(a) (1994)); Civil Air Navigation Bill, H.R. Cong. Rep. No. 1262, 68th
Cong., at 26 (2d Sess. 1925).
32 Another reason was that the Federal Government subsidized all U.S. airlines
through contracts to provide airmail service. Congress wanted to make sure that
only U.S. citizens would receive such financial support.
3 See H.R. Cong. Rep. No. 1262 (1925); see also H.R. Rep. No. 1653, 68th
Cong. at 527 (1925) (quoting Major General Patrick, "We will never have a mili-
tary Air Service sufficient to meet a major war emergency. We will have to de-
pend upon civilian agencies to supplement our needs in such emergency.")
34 See Defense Production Act of 1950, ch. 932, 64 Stat. 798 (1950) (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 2061-2170 (1994)); under the CRAF's three stage pro-
gram, carriers that have contractually committed to the Department of Defense
(DOD) to provide civilian support for emergency military airlift operations, must
make planes available for the program's activation. The DOD pays the airlines on
a sliding scale for each international trip, depending on the distance, the cargo,
and the number of troops carried. Currently, 35 carriers with 729 aircraft partici-
pate in the program. The program was activated for the first time in August 1990
to shuttle troops and supplies to and from Saudia Arabia as part of the U.S. oper-
ation against Iraq.
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through tariffs and quotas. Thus, Congress intended to support
the economic welfare of U.S. air carriers and to protect the avia-
tion industry from foreign competition. 5 The citizenship re-
quirement was a subtle way to pursue that goal, which could be
done without openly declaring quotas and tariffs.
The United States was also concerned about the fact that
outside of its borders a majority of the world's air carriers were
often state-owned and heavily subsidized. The statutory require-
ment of U.S. citizenship was intended to prevent a state-owned
carrier from buying a U.S. carrier and competing unfairly in the
U.S. domestic market to the detriment of other U.S. carriers.
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, which further modifies the
provisions of the prior acts, governs who may operate a commer-
cial aircraft in the United States. A person wishing to operate an
aircraft within the U.S. is required to apply for a "certificate of
public convenience and necessity" (analogous to a license) from
the DOT. To obtain such a certificate, the airline must be in
compliance with 49 U.S.C. § 41102(b) (1996), which stipulates
that the Secretary of Transportation may issue a certificate only
to a U.S. citizen if the citizen is fit, willing, and able to provide
the proposed transportation. The Federal Aviation Act thereby
reserves the domestic air services market, i.e., the cabotage
rights, for carriers that are owned by U.S. citizens. 6 The Act
defines a citizen of the United States as:
(a) an individual who is a citizen of the United States or of one
of its possessions, or
(b) a partnership of which each member is such an individual,
or
(c) a corporation or association created or organized under the
laws of the United States or any State, Territory, or posses-
sion of the United States, of which the President and at least
two-third or more of the board of directors and other man-
aging officers thereof are such individuals and in which at
least 75 percent of the voting interest is owned or controlled
by persons that are citizens of the United States or one of its
possessions 7
The DOT and its predecessor, the Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB), have consistently interpreted this section to mean that
35 See Copeland Report on the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, reprinted in THE
ECONOMIc REGULATION OF BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY, 3063 (Bernhard Schwartz, ed.
1973).
36 See 49 U.S.C. §§ 41703(b), 41102(a), 41103(a) (1994).
37 See 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a) (15) (1994).
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the carrier must actually be controlled by U.S. citizens in order
to qualify for a certificate of public convenience. Despite a pos-
sible literal interpretation of the section, which provides that
75% of the voting interest must be owned or controlled by U.S.
citizens, the agencies have consistently held that the definition
should be interpreted conjunctively requiring that carriers must
be owned and controlled by U.S. citizens. 8 The DOT, however,
has not defined the notion of "control" or established a "check-
list" standard in order to determine whether a U.S. airline is
actually controlled by U.S. citizens. 9 In its 1989 KLM/Northwest
decision, the DOT explained the analysis of "control" as follows:
[It] has always necessarily been on a case-by-case basis, as there
are myriad potential avenues of control. The control standard is
a de facto one-we seek to discover whether a foreign interest
may be in a position to exercise actual control over the airline,
i.e., whether it will have a substantial ability to influence the car-
rier's activities.40
The DOT further clarified that foreign influence need not be
identified with any particular nationality nor with any "sinister
intent."'" Essentially, the DOT distinguishes between two types
of foreign control, namely financial control through equity own-
ership and control through personal relationships.
2. Control Through Equity Ownership
According to the Federal Aviation Act, a corporation is con-
sidered a U.S. citizen if at least 75% of the voting interest is
owned and controlled by a U.S. citizen. Thus, a foreign investor
can only acquire a voting interest in a U.S. carrier of up to
25%.42 Since the law is silent as to the amount of non-voting
equity capital and debt that a foreign carrier can invest in a U.S.
airline, it is possible for the DOT to conclude that the defini-
38 See Willye Peter Daetwyler d/b/a Interamerican Airfreight Co., Foreign Per-
mit, 58 C.A.B. 118,120-121 (1971) (emphasis added);John T.Stewart, United States
Citizenship Requirements of the Federal Aviation Act - A Misty Moor of Legalisms or the
Rampart of Protectionism, 55 J. AIR L. & COM. 685, 705 (1990).
39 Wrangler Aviation, Inc., D.O.T. Order 93-7-26, at 5 (1993); Westates Air-
lines, Inc., D.O.T. Order 94-3-52, at 15 (1994).
40 Wings Holding, Inc., D.O.T. Order 89-9-51, at 4-5 (1989).
41 Intera Arctic Services, Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 87-8-43, at 5 (1987).
42 See supra at §II(B). By restricting foreign investment to 25%, the United
States and Canada have among the most restrictive regulations. Australia has
recently lifted its foreign ownership restrictions up to 49% in an international
airline and up to 100% in a domestic carrier. SeeAustralian Government to Ease
Foreign Ownership Restrictions, AVIATION DAiLY, Aug. 19, 1999, at 3.
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tional reference to "voting stock" permits foreign investors to
hold non-voting stock in a larger percentage than voting stock.
Despite its generally minor power, non-voting equity capital or
debt can also allow a foreign investor to exercise a certain de-
gree of control and to neutralize the U.S.-owned voting stock.
Therefore, the critical issue is how much non-voting equity capi-
tal or debt a foreign investor can hold in a U.S. carrier and what
other factors may be relevant in order to determine whether the
carrier is still in compliance with the statutory requirement. Sev-
eral decisions by the CAB and the DOT address this issue.
a. The Decision in Page Avjet, et al.
In Page Avjet,4" the CAB approved a non-U.S. citizen holding
about 9% of the outstanding stock of all classes of a U.S. air
carrier, but also stated that a dominating influence may be exer-
cised in ways other than through voting. The case involved a
foreign investor who acquired 100% of the non-voting shares,
which gave him the right to vote on company mergers, acquisi-
tions, consolidations, and the company liquidation. The CAB
concluded that the non-voting shareholder had the right to in-
fluence many of the crucial decisions of the company. In partic-
ular, they had the power to block any proposal by the voting-
shareholders on the above-mentioned issues.4 4 The Board ap-
proved the deal, however, but only after Page Avjet had estab-
lished a buy-out provision according to which the voting
shareholders could buy back the non-voting shares if the latter
blocked a corporate action.45
In a more recent decision, Intera Arctic Services ("IAS"),46 the
DOT restated that "a corporation must not only meet the ex-
plicit numerical requirements of [the Federal Aviation Act] but
must also, as a factual matter, actually be controlled by U.S. citi-
zens." The DOT ruled that LAS, which held about 82% of the
outstanding stock of all classes, failed to show its independence
from foreign control in two respects. First, the bylaws of the
carrier allowed the foreign non-voting interests to force the
company to buy them out. Second, in the event the carrier
43 See Page Avjet, Citizenship, DOT Order 83-7-5, 102 C.A.B. 488, at 490
(1983).
44 See id. at 491; see also DOT Order 93-7-26, supra note 39, at 15 (stating "veto
control over substantive management decisions . . .by "supermajority veto".)
45 See Page Avjet, supra note 43, at 492.
46 Intera Arctic Services, Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 87-8-43, at 3 (1987).
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would be profitable, the foreign non-voting interests would re-
ceive most of the reward.47
In another decision, Transpacific Enterprises and America West
Airlines,48 the DOT permitted an Australian corporation to ac-
quire 20% of the voting stock of America West Airlines. Despite
the fact that the parties to the transaction had taken different
steps to prevent a future violation of the citizenship require-
ment (such as amending the charter to prohibit foreign citizens
from owning more than 25% of the voting stock), the DOT in-
quired into other links between America West and affiliates in
the Australian investor's corporate structure before approving
the deal.49
These decisions reflect a very restrictive form of interpreta-
tion, which goes beyond the wording of the statutory require-
ment of 75% U.S. citizen ownership. The DOT views the limit
of 25% of voting equity as merely a threshold issue. It then con-
centrates on the question whether the foreign investor can actu-
ally exercise control in any given form, not only through vote.
However, these decisions do not allow the formulation of any
precise standard to determine under what circumstances a car-
rier is able to maintain its U.S. citizenship status.
b. The Northwest-KLM decisions
In the 1989 buyout of the then-failing Northwest Airlines,
KLM Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM), through its subsidiary Wings
Holding, contributed $400 million of the $705 million in equity
involved in that transaction. According to the terms of the
agreement, KLM would, together with all other foreign share-
holders, hold less than 25% of the voting stock, but would have
the right both to block any amendments to the certificate of
incorporation and to appoint one of the airline holding com-
pany's twelve directors. Furthermore, KLM would be able to
name a three-person financial advisory committee to advise
Northwest on management and financial affairs.5"
Despite the fact that KLM would own far less than 25% of the
voting stock, the DOT found that KLM would be in a position to
exercise control over Northwest through KLM's subsidiary
Wings, Northwest's holding company, and prohibited the
47 See id. at 11-12.
4s Transpacific Enter., Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 87-8-31 (1987).
49 See id. at 4.
50 See Wings Holding, Inc., D.O.T. Order 89-9-51 (1989).
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buyout from proceeding under its original terms. In its consent
order, the DOT stated that in order to determine whether a U.S.
carrier could maintain its U.S. citizenship status, it would con-
sider "whether a foreign interest may be in a position to exercise
actual control over the airline, i.e., whether it will have a sub-
stantial ability to influence the carrier's activities."'" The DOT
restated that it would decide citizen status on a case-by-case ba-
sis, looking at the multiplicity of contacts between the foreign
and the U.S. air carriers. The DOT believed that a large share
in a carrier's equity posed citizenship problems, even when the
interest did not take the form of voting stock. It concluded that
KLM's non-voting stock was equity, and, as such, represents a
genuine ownership interest. Thus, KLM would closely follow
the fortunes of Northwest and would have a strong incentive to
influence the airline's business decisions. 2
In order to eliminate the DOT's concerns, Northwest and
KLM (Wings) agreed to reduce KLM's share to a maximum of
25% of total equity. Furthermore, the parties agreed to termi-
nate KLM's right to appoint a financial advisory committee and
to recuse KLM's representative on Northwest's board in speci-
fied circumstances.53 In addition, Northwest and Wings agreed
to file regular reports concerning their ownership structure. Ul-
timately, the DOT approved the transaction, concluding that
KLM's ability to influence Northwest had been significantly
reduced. 4
In 1991, Wings Holding requested a modification of the origi-
nal consent decree, asking to permit KLM to increase its non-
voting equity investment up to 49% with just over 10% held as
voting shares and also to permit KLM to designate three mem-
bers of the holding company's board after the board was in-
creased from twelve to fifteen members.5 The DOT permitted
the modification, basing its change in policy on its "reassess-
ment of the complexities of today's corporate and financial envi-
ronment, a reexamination of the relationship between
nonvoting equity/debt and control in light of recent experience
in this area. '56 The DOT then stated that it would allow a total
foreign equity investment of up to 49%, including both voting
51 Id. at 5.
52 See id. at 6.
53 See id. at 8, 9.
54 See id. at 10, 11.
55 See Wings Holding, Inc., D.O.T. Order 91-1-41, at 4 (1991).
56 Id. at 7.
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and non-voting stock, so long as the foreign equity did not ex-
ceed 25% of voting shares and U.S. citizens actually control the
air carrier.17 Moreover, the DOT noted that U.S. carriers have
taken on sizable amounts of debts from foreign sources and also
noted that debt arrangements pose little risk for foreign control.
It concluded that, absent loan default, unless the loan agree-
ment provides special rights to the debtor, it would not consider
debt to be a factor in evaluating foreign control.5"
Summarizing this significant decision, the DOT made a dis-
tinction between voting equity on the one hand and non-voting
equity and debt on the other, and acknowledged their differ-
ences in terms of influence and power. By making this clear
distinction, the DOT has liberalized its foreign investment pol-
icy significantly, as foreign carriers may invest up to 49% in total
equity. The DOT also clarified that, absent extraordinary cir-
cumstances, it would not consider debt to be a factor in deter-
mining control. In doing so, the DOT has eliminated the
uncertainty as to the significance of non-voting equity at least to
some degree. However, it did not depart from the statutory lim-
itation on foreign investment, which only allows a voting equity
of up to 25%.
It is worth noting that the then-ongoing bilateral negotiations
between the U.S. and the Netherlands and the fact that both
parties had entered into an Open Skies agreement, thereby pro-
viding U.S. carriers with access to the EU market, were decisive
for the DOT in subsequently authorizing the deal.59 It is signifi-
cant that the DOT considers U.S. foreign aviation policy as a
legitimate criterion when evaluating an investment by a foreign
carrier when the Federal Aviation Act itself does not mention it.
c. The USAir-British Airways Transaction
In 1992, the DOT addressed the USAir-British Airways (BA)
deal in which British Airways would make an investment of $750
million in USAir, gaining 44% of USAir's total equity, including
21% of its voting stock, and representation on the USAir board.
The airlines would coordinate their operations and eventually
57 See id. at 9.
58 See id.
59 See id. at 7-8. "We reached these decisions in the context of the liberalized
aviation relationship that prevails between the United States and KLM's
homeland."
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merge into one brand name.6" The proposal caused a major
controversy because British Airways would gain both greater ac-
cess to the U.S. market and control over a U.S. airline-while
the access of U.S. carriers to the British market would continue
to remain very limited. Moreover, the ongoing bilateral negotia-
tions between the United States and Great Britain had failed to
provide U.S. carriers additional access to London's Heathrow
Airport.61 After it was reported that the DOT would disapprove
the deal (because of the violation of the foreign ownership re-
strictions), British Airways withdrew its original proposal rather
than face the anticipated rejection of the agreement. In 1993,
the parties returned with a new investment arrangement, which
included an investment by BA of $300 million for a 19.9% stake
in USAir and excluded the common branding proposed in the
first deal. This time, the DOT approved the transaction under
the condition that every further BA investment would be subject
to DOT approval.
Although the DOT did not rule on the original proposal, it
was generally assumed that the DOT would not approve it. Sig-
nificantly, the terms of the original transaction (44% total eq-
uity, 21% voting equity) did not exceed the equity stakes that
had emerged from the 1992 KLM/Northwest decision as the gen-
eral standard the DOT would follow (49% total equity, 25% vot-
ing equity). But one can presume that the DOT had also paid
attention to the failing bilateral negotiations between the
United States and Great Britain regarding additional access for
U.S. carriers to Heathrow. Like in the KLM-Northwest decision,
which was favorably affected by the U.S.-Netherlands Open Skies
agreement, the DOT seemed to be influenced by political fac-
tors in the BA-USAir case and, therefore, did not follow the stan-
dard developed in KLM-Northwest. Consequently, it would seem
that although the KLM-Northwest decision appeared to state a
clear standard, the determination whether a carrier is able to
maintain its U.S. citizenship status still cannot be reached with-
out considering certain uncertainties.
6 Clock is running on DOT to review BA/USAir Deal, AvixTiON DALY, July 31,
1992, at 186.
61 As of April 2000, the U.S. and U.K. negotiators were still not able to agree
on a new bilateral agreement.
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d. Publicly Traded Companies
In the case of a publicly traded carrier, the ownership of the
carrier may be very dispersed, and the nationality of the stock-
holders unclear. U.S. laws provide two mechanisms to keep
track of the ownership status of publicly traded carriers.
Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 41110 (e), a carrier must continue to
be fit to conduct the transportation authorized and to comply
with the statutory requirements. According to the DOT's ad-
ministrative rules, when an air carrier proposes to undergo a
substantial change in operations, ownership, or management, it
must notify the DOT of the proposed substantial change.62 A
substantial change in ownership is defined as "[t]he acquisition
by a new shareholder or the accumulation by an existing share-
holder of beneficial control of 10% or more of the outstanding
voting stock."63
Changes in a carrier's ownership structure occur in various
ways for various reasons. According to the DOT, the frequent
sales and acquisitions of relatively small percentages of stock,
such as occur with large carriers whose stocks are publicly
traded, usually do not meet the DOT's definition of 'substantial'
and do not result in a change in control of the company.64
However, even a minimum change of only 10% of the stock
ownership in a widely held company, where the largest share-
holder may beneficially control a relatively small percentage of
the company, can lead to a change in influence, if not in out-
right control, of the company's policies and operational
decisions.
The second mechanism, the Securities Exchange Act of
193465 provides for the disclosure of smaller percentages traded.
According to § 13 (g) (1) of the Act, any person who is directly
or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 5% of any secur-
ity is required to send to the issuer of the security and to file
with the Securities Exchange Commission a statement describ-
ing the person's identity, residence, and citizenship. Any
smaller number of shares acquired is, therefore, not considered
to impose a risk of foreign control.
62 See 14 C.F.R. 204.5 (2000).
63 See 14 C.F.R. 204.2 (1)(3) (2000).
64 Notification requirements concerning substantial changes in ownership and
operations pursuant to §§ 41110(e) and 41708 of Title 49 of the United States
Code and Section 204.5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, D.O.T. Notice, July
21, 1998.
65 15 U.S.C. §§ 7 8(g)(1) et. seq. (1994).
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3. Control Through Personal Relationships
In terms of personal relationships, the DOT examines the or-
ganizational configuration of an air carrier, namely potential re-
lationships of directors and officers with foreign air carriers, and
whether these relationships would allow the foreign carrier to
exercise-either directly or indirectly-a degree of control that
would outweigh the otherwise U.S. controlling interest. 66 In an
early decision, the CAB determined that a carrier failed to meet
the citizenship requirement because several of its officers and
employees enjoyed long-standing personal and professional re-
lationships with the Swiss investor.67 The CAB clarified that it
would look beyond corporate structures and U.S. "citizen front
men" in order to ascertain who actually runs the company. It
held that the definition of a U.S. citizen does not embrace cor-
porations that formally meet the requirements of the law but
that are actually controlled and run by a foreign national. In a
subsequent decision, Intera Arctic Services,68 the DOT placed
heavy emphasis on the fact that two IAS directors were also di-
rectors of a foreign carrier. Despite their U.S. citizenship, the
DOT characterized these two directors as "ready conduits" for
exercise of control by the foreign interest. In contrast, in Page
Avjet, the DOT found the carrier to be a U.S. carrier because its
bylaws prohibited the affiliation of its directors with its foreign
parent.69
In a 1989 decision, Discovery Airways, the DOT raised no objec-
tion to an Italian shareholder holding about 15% of both voting
and non-voting stock, but required him removed from all execu-
tive functions to reduce his executive control. 0 In its 1991 deci-
sion concerning the KLM investment in Northwest Airlines, the
DOT made it clear that it "would not allow a foreign citizen to
hold the position of chairman of the board" or a "disproportion-
ate number of foreign director representatives to [be on] im-
portant committees, such as the executive committee,
nominating committee, or finance committee."'"
- SeeJames E. Gjerset, Crippling United States Airlines: Archaic Interpretations of the
Federal Aviation Act's Restriction on Foreign Capital Investments, 7 AM U. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 173, 188 (1991).
67 See 58 C.A.B. at 120.
68 See Intera Arctic Services, supra note 41, at 120.
69 See Page Avjet, supra note 43, at 8.
70 See Application of Discovery Airways, Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 89-12-41, at 11
(1989).
71 Northwest Airlines, supra note 55, at 11.
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In its 1992 Executive AirFleet decision, the DOT objected to the
influence of the Swiss minority shareholder, Jet Aviation, on the
senior management. Several of Executive's principals were for-
mer employees of Jet and had acted as consultants ofJet. More-
over, "Executive and Jet [had] shared undifferentiated office
space as well as the same telephone number. ' 72 The cross-hiring
and the close proximity of Executive and Jet led the DOT to
conclude that the key employees of Executive were reporting to
Jet, thereby allowing Jet to control Executive.73
Thus, in determining who is to be considered a U.S. citizen,
the DOT closely examines whether the U.S. citizens-share-
holders, directors, management-have strong ties with foreign
interests and whether these ties might weaken the individual's
ability to exercise independent control over the U.S. carrier.
The DOT has recognized that personal relationships between
U.S. citizens and foreign purchasers can provide a more subtle
method to exercise control. As a general rule, it can be stated
that, although foreigners are not totally prevented from serving
on the board or as management, they may not generally serve as
chairman of the board or in other key functions. Former links,
such as employment contracts, or a spatial proximity with the
foreign investor may also impair the U.S. citizenship status.
4. Conclusion
It can be concluded that, while the DOT adheres to the statu-
tory limitations imposed by Congress and the Federal Aviation
Act, it allows itself great latitude in interpreting those limita-
tions. Considering the DOT's decisions, the general rule
emerges that in the case where numerical requirements are met,
the following factors in foreign hands may nevertheless jeopard-
ize U.S. citizenship:
1. "a supermajority voting power, a block voting power or a
veto power associated with ownership; '74
2. a shareholder agreement that entitles the foreign share-
holder to any rights beyond its equity interest;
75
72 Executive Air Fleet, Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 92-9-46 (1992).
73 See id. at 2; see also Wrangler Aviation, Inc., D.O.T. Order 93-7-26, at 5 (1993)
("pervasive financial and employment relationships with the Singapore
interests").
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3. foreign debt or foreign lines of credit in the extraordinary
case only, as when the loan agreement provides special
rights to the debt holder;76
4. close links of shareholders, directors, or management with
the foreign investor.77
Despite these criteria, however, the notion of effective control
remains, to some degree, uncertain. 78 As seen in the KLM/
Northwest and USAir-British Airways cases, the DOT also takes into
account political factors, such as the willingness of other coun-
tries to enter into favorable bilateral air services agreements.
Therefore, the standard set out in the 1992 KLM/Northwest deci-
sion, which allows a total foreign equity of 49% so long as the
voting-interest does not exceed 25%, cannot serve as a general
standard applicable to all cases regardless of their specific
circumstances.
III. OWNERSHIP REQUIREMENTS IN BILATERAL AIR
SERVICES AGREEMENTS
The ownership and control requirements not only influence
the domestic cabotage laws, but also play an important role in
the bilateral context. Under its traditional bilateral agreement,
the United States has the right to withhold or revoke the rights
of foreign carriers if they are not substantially owned and effec-
tively controlled by nationals of the state that has designated
them to exploit the air traffic rights granted under the bilateral
agreement. However, both the CAB and DOT, waived this right
in many decisions. In a 1969 decision, Air Jamaica Ltd.,79 the
CAB waived the right because it considered the applicant to be a
"friendly, neighboring" country that does not present a threat to
national security. In Seagreen Air Transport, Ltd.,8" the CAB stated
that it would be willing to waive the nationality requirement "in
appropriate circumstances."'" The Board reasoned that its pol-
icy is directed against the "absentee ownership" and a waiver
76 See id.
77 See id.
78 See Jeffrey Donner Brown, Foreign Investment in U.S. Airlines: What Limits
Should Be Placed on Foreign Ownership of U.S. Carriers?, 41 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1269,
1288 (1990); see also Stewart, supra note 38, at 687.
79 Air Jamaica Ltd., Foreign Air Carrier Permit, 44 C.A.B. 169, 171 (1966).
80 Seagreen Air Transport, Ltd. Foreign Permit, 53 C.A.B. 235 (1970)
81 Seagreen Air Transport, Ltd. Foreign Permit at 245; see also Seagreen Air Trans-
port, Ltd., Permit Renewal, 59 C.A.B. 462, 467 (1972).
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would be appropriate when the owner is a resident of the
designating state.82
The DOT did not restate the policy indicated by the CAB and
seemed to change its criteria for whether a waiver should be
granted. In a case concerning the U.S.-Argentine bilateral
agreement, Spain's Iberia has acquired a majority ownership
(85%) in Aerolfneas Argentinas, enabling it to effectively con-
trol the carrier."3 Aerolfneas Argentinas has kept its principal
place of business in Buenos Aires and will possibly establish a
main place of business in Madrid. Yet the DOT, without articu-
lating a justification for the waiving its right, did not challenge
Aerolineas Argentinas' nationality and the DOT accepted that it
remains an Argentinean designated air carrier under the U.S.-
Argentine bilateral agreement-although the carrier had clearly
lost its Argentinean nationality and was in fact controlled by
Spain.
In Translux International Airlines SA d/b/a Cargo Lion (Cargo
Lion), 4 the DOT waived the traditional citizenship require-
ments under the U.S.-Luxembourg bilateral agreement and
granted a permit to the carrier to conduct all-cargo charter op-
erations."5 Translux's major shareholders were a German na-
tional who owned 49% and a Swiss national who owned 41% of
the stock. The DOT reasoned that it found it appropriate to
waive the ownership and control requirements when "there
[was] nothing in the ownership and control of [the carrier] that
would be inimical to U.S. aviation policy or interest[s]." 6
There appear few rational justifications under which the DOT
could refuse to waive the ownership and control requirements
in bilateral agreements. Unless the carrier is owned by a third
party that is presumed to be of sinister intent toward the United
States and, as stated in Cargo Lion, toward the U.S. aviation pol-
icy, the issue of who owns a designated foreign carrier has no
effect on U.S. interests. However, even if it is likely that the
DOT would rarely if ever challenge the ownership of a desig-
82 See Seagreen Air Transport, Ltd. Foreign Permit at 246.
83 On the privatization of Aerolfneas Argentinas, see Rogelio N. Maciel, Aerolin-
eas Argentinas Goes Private, 15 AIR LAW 93 (1990).
84 See Application of Translux International Airlines SA d/b/a Cargo Lion,
D.O.T. Docket 50362, 18 (1996).
85 Translux International Airlines SA d/b/a Cargo Lion, D.O.T. Docket OST
98-4329 (1998).
86 Id.; see also Applications of Various Foreign Air Carriers, D.O.T. Order 95-3-7
(1995).
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nated foreign carrier, the legal uncertainty remains since the
DOT could, in any case brought before it, refuse to waive the
requirements. Moreover, traditional ownership requirements in
bilateral air transport agreements constitute a bargaining chip,
which the DOT might try to use in bilateral negotiations to
achieve greater access for U.S. carriers to foreign markets. As
the KLM/Northwest and USAir-British Ainays cases have shown,
the DOT indeed links the outcome in a particular decision to
the U.S. success in bilateral negotiations. Consequently, any in-
vestor who is willing to invest substantial equity in a foreign air-
line, which is designated to operate services to the U.S.,
encounters the risk that the DOT might on some occasion chal-
lenge the carrier's ownership.
In addition, the DOT did not change its policy towards U.S.
foreign investment laws in its Open Skies policy. In fact, the
Open Skies agreements, which the U.S. entered into since the
publication of the Open Skies policy in 1992, still contain the
traditional ownership and control clause. A remarkable altera-
tion of Open Skies is contained in the 1996 amendment of the
U.S.-German bilateral agreement (the "1996 Protocol").87 Since
the 1996 Protocol amended the traditional nationality clause, it
can therefore be distinguished from other U.S. bilateral Open
Skies agreements with European countries.88 In Article 3 (3) of
the 1996 Protocol, both sides agreed reciprocally to waive their
right to withhold or revoke operating permission of a third
country's carrier, under the applicable article of the relevant bi-
lateral air services arrangement between the contracting party,
i.e., the U.S. or Germany, and the third country, "[w]here na-
tionals of either contracting party hold an ownership interest of
less than 50 percent in an airline incorporated and having its
principal place of business in a third state,... solely on the basis
that ownership interest ... constitutes control or effective con-
trol."89 The provision also requires that "the third state permits
airlines of both contracting parties to invest in airlines incorpo-
rated and having the principal place of business in that third
state on an equal basis, and . .. that the relevant bilateral air
services arrangements between each contracting party and that
third state are 'Open Skies' agreements."90
87 See Bartkowski and Byerly, supra note 23, at 33.
88 See Jung, supra note 27, at 500 (outlining more differences between the
traditional 'Open Skies' agreement and the U.S.-German bilateral agreement).
89 Bartkowski and Byerly, supra note 23, at 35.
90 Id.
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The provision clarifies that the air services arrangements be-
tween Germany and other members of the EU are deemed
equivalents of Open Skies agreements and that the current EU
legislation governing investment in EU airlines permits airlines
of both contracting parties to invest in airlines of EU Member
States with an equity of less than 50%. This determination
makes clear that both U.S. and German airlines can make invest-
ments of less than 50% in other EU carriers without risking
their foreign carrier permits under the U.S.-German bilateral
agreement. Thus, if Lufthansa were to acquire a 49% stake in
Alitalia, the United States would have no right to challenge the
nationality of Alitalia under the US-Italian bilateral agreement.
But the traditional citizenship clause, authorizing each side to
object to operations under the agreement by an airline desig-
nated by the other side if that airline is not substantially owned
and effectively controlled by nationals of that side, is still part of
the U.S.-German agreement.9' Hence, in case a third country's
carrier were to acquire an interest in Lufthansa, the 1996 Proto-
col would not prevent the United States from claiming that Luf-
thansa has lost its traffic rights under the U.S.-German bilateral.
The explicit provision in the U.S.-German bilateral agree-
ment, waiving the right to object to the nationality of third
countries' carrier under certain circumstances, allows the con-
clusion that there is indeed a distinction between waiving the
right to object within the bilateral agreement on the one hand
and waiving the right to object to a third country's carrier on the
other hand. It can be assumed that the U.S. government in-
tended to maintain its right to withhold or revoke a carrier's
operating permit in case it is not substantially owned and effec-
tively controlled by German nationals, and vice versa. This dis-
tinction increases the uncertainty as to whether and under what
circumstances the DOT is willing to waive its right to object to
ownership and control of a designated carrier under a bilateral
air services agreement.
Therefore, the DOT's more liberal approach, taken in its Aero-
lineas Argentinas and Translux decisions, does not allow the con-
clusion that the DOT would always, despite the explicit
provisions of its bilateral air transport agreements, waive the
ownership and control requirements when granting or re-
newing a foreign air carrier permit. Therefore, uncertainty re-
91 1996 Protocol, Art. 3 (2), 4 (1), supra note 23.
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mains as to when an investor can invest in a foreign airline
without risking that carrier's U.S. foreign air carrier permit.
IV. PROPOSALS TO AMEND THE FEDERAL
AVIATION ACT
Foreign interests continue to seek investment opportunities
in U.S. carriers.92 It appears as if the idea of opening the U.S.
air services market to foreign investment by relaxing the citizen-
ship requirements may be gaining some momentum in Wash-
ington. 93 There are proposals to raise the investment ceiling to
49% in voting equity, bringing the U.S. requirements into line
with the European Union, which allows non-EU investment in
EU carriers up to 49% in both voting and non-voting equity.1
4
The major argument in favor of a higher foreign investment
limit is that the U.S. airline industry would have access to a
deeper capital market, in particular in case of a failing company
that is in need of capital.95 Financially troubled carriers, such as
TWA or low-cost start-up carriers, could be supported more ef-
fectively by foreign capital and would have a better chance of
long-term success, which would further enhance competition
among U.S. carriers. This is particularly true after the Valujet
crash of 1996, as since then capital investment U.S. for start-up
carriers is extremely scarce. 96
However, despite various activities and proposals, there are
currently no indications that Congress would amend the Federal
92 Richard Branson, the owner of Virgin Atlantic Airways, "sought to invest
$200 million in a low-fare domestic airline based in New York... but was blocked
from [it] because he is not a U.S. citizen." Kenneth J. Button, Open U.S. Skies to
Global Competition, J. or COM., Dec. 23, 1998, at 5A.
93 The former DOT Assistant Secretary for Aviation, Charles Hunnicutt, called
for "establishing a single, open worldwide aviation market while questioning ex-
isting U.S. restrictions on foreign investment." Id.; see also National Commission
to Ensure a Strong Competitive Airline Industry, CHANGE, CHALLENGE, AND COM-
PETITION: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS, at 22 (1993); Anna Wilde
Matthews, Report on Airlines Urges Government To Take Action to Boost Competition,
WALL ST. J., July 30, 1999 at A4 (Report from the National Research Council,
calling for an end to restrictions on foreign ownership); Andreas Lowenfeld and
Allan I. Mendelsohn, Let Foreigners Own US Airlines, J. OF COM., March 26, 1999, at
5A.
94 See Council Regulation (EEC) 2407/92, art. 4(2), 1992 O.J. (L 240) 1; see also
Commission Decision, Swissair/Sabena, 1995 OJ. (L 239) 19.
95 See Brown, supra note 78 at 1271; See also Gjerset, supra note 66, at 193.
96 Andreas Lowenfeld and Allan I. Mendelsohn, supra note 93. But the recent
foundry of well-financed jet Blue may mean that capital investment for new start-
ups may becoming more readily available.
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Aviation Act and ease the ownership requirements in the near
future, and the proponents of the current statutory regime are
strongly lobbying for maintaining the regime. The debate is fo-
cusing on the following issues.
A. NATIONAL DEFENSE
The U.S. citizenship requirement is based on one major pol-
icy, namely the policy to assure that sufficient aircraft will be
available for U.S. national security purposes. The Department
of Defense (DOD) opposes any change in the foreign ownership
requirements for fear that foreign-owned U.S. airlines may not
sufficiently participate or even refuse to participate in the Civil
Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program or, in the event of an emer-
gency, remove their U.S. aircraft from U.S. territory.97 Moreo-
ver, it is argued that airlines that are actually controlled by
foreigners "may act as instruments for their [respective] govern-
ments." '' In contrast, proponents of higher investment limits
consider the national security concern overstated and do not see
any "compelling national security reasons for limiting foreign
investments. "99
To determine the validity of these arguments, it is necessary to
examine whether a change in the ownership and control re-
quirements may result in a change in the cabotage laws, al-
lowing foreign airlines to operate within the U.S. Even with
higher foreign investments limits in U.S. carriers, airlines oper-
ating domestically in the U.S. would still be required to have a
certificate of convenience and necessity and to comply fully with
all applicable U.S. laws. The major reason to invest in a U.S. air
carrier is that foreign carriers, through their respective subsidi-
aries, want to participate in the U.S. domestic market, which is
the largest aviation market in the world. Foreign carriers would
not invest in U.S. carriers in order to get access to aircraft and to
use these aircraft in their homeland markets. It is, therefore,
most unlikely that foreign carriers that have invested in U.S. car-
riers would, in the event of an emergency, remove the U.S. carri-
ers' aircraft from the U.S. market. Moreover, the use of
contracts could safeguard the participation of U.S. carriers in
97 See Opinion of Gen. Charles T. Robertson, The Civil Reserve Air Fleet: Essential
for Defense, AVIATION DAILY, Feb. 10, 2000.
98 Angela Edwards, Foreign Investment in the U.S. Airline Industry: Friend or Foe?, 9
EMORY INT'L L. REv. 595, 641 (1995).
99 Brown, supra note 78, at 1285; Warner, supra note 10, at 310.
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CRAF and the necessary supply of aircraft.100 Combining a con-
tractual commitment with the personal liability of directors and
managing officers would raise the likelihood of compliance with
the CRAF program. Even if the DOD is not satisfied with a car-
rier's contractual commitment to participate in CRAF, the DOD
could require a lower foreign investment limit for airlines that
want to participate in the CRAF program, such as the current
25% limit. Since participation in the CRAF program is compen-
sated on a regular basis, it can be assumed that several U.S. air-
lines would still be interested in participating in the program.
In order to qualify for the program, airlines then must meet the
standard set forth by the DOD. As these different ways of guar-
anteeing the necessary supply for the CRAF program demon-
strate, national defense concerns do not present a valid reason
to maintain the current regime.
B. JoBs
The second heavily debated concern, which is mainly empha-
sized by the labor unions, is the employment of U.S. workers in
the aviation industry. The unions fear that major foreign invest-
ments in U.S. air carriers and intensified cooperation between
U.S. and foreign carriers could eliminate U.S. jobs in the avia-
tion industry. They argue that foreign investors would use their
control over U.S. airlines to replace U.S. workers with foreign
workers. 101 Moreover, they assert that a higher foreign invest-
ment limit would not only lead to the employment of foreign
pilots and officers, but would negatively affect the seniority
levels of U.S. staff.
As in the national defense debate, it has to be clarified that
the opening of the U.S. domestic market, i.e., cabotage, for for-
eign carriers, which are not subject to U.S. laws, is not at issue
here because the suggested higher foreign investment limits
would not open the U.S. domestic market for foreign carriers.
U.S. airlines receiving a major foreign investment remain U.S.
carriers that must register in the U.S.; must comply with U.S.
laws including U.S. safety regulations; must pay taxes in the U.S.;
and must, in principle, employ U.S. citizens. Even if U.S. carri-
100 See Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, supra note 93.
101 See U.S. General Accounting Office, AIRLINE COMPETITION: STRATEGIES FOR
ADDRESSING FINANCIAL AND COMPETITIVE PROBLEMS IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY, at 7
(1993); see also Edwards, supra note 98, at 636-38; Sonny Hall, Don't Let Foreign
Interests Control US Airlines, J. OF COM., June 16, 1999, at 8.
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ers would have the opportunity to employ foreign crews, it can
be assumed that at least in comparison to most of the EU coun-
tries, labor costs in the U.S. are lower than in EU countries, such
as Germany, the Netherlands, and France. U.S. carriers, even
with a substantial foreign investment, would thus have an eco-
nomic incentive to employ U.S. citizens. Consequently, higher
foreign investment limits would not inevitably endanger U.S.
jobs.
C. RECIPROCITY
A third factor for opposing any changes in the ownership laws
is the use of ownership and control requirements as bargaining
chips in bilateral negotiations. 1 2 By reducing the limitations on
foreign investment and allowing a higher foreign equity interest
unilaterally, the U.S. would lose leverage and reduce its bargain-
ing strength in bilateral negotiations.10 The fear is that if a for-
eign carrier were allowed to acquire a major voting interest in a
U.S. carrier, such as a voting interest of 49%, it could virtually
gain access to the U.S. domestic market and thereby circumvent
the cabotage laws "via [the] actual control of U.S. airlines. '"104 It
is argued that foreign governments, whose air carriers are al-
lowed a higher investments in U.S. airlines, would have little in-
centive to grant U.S. carriers greater access to their own market.
Conversely, proponents of an amendment, such as The National
Commission to Ensure a Strong Competitive Airline Industry,
contend higher foreign investment limits would encourage
other countries to open their markets and to enable the DOT to
negotiate more liberal bilateral agreements. 105
Equal treatment and reciprocity in international agreements
are very important factors guaranteeing both parties' satisfac-
tion and commitment to their contractual obligations. Conse-
quently, it would be in the interest of the United States as well as
other countries to liberalize their respective ownership and con-
trol requirements on a reciprocal basis. Thus, the U.S. could
allow foreign carriers to invest more than 25% of voting-equity
in a U.S. carrier if the other country grants the same right to
U.S. investors. In the European Union, U.S. carriers may al-
102 Warner, supra note 10, at 320.
103 See Edwards, supra note 98, at 629.
104 Id. at 628.
105 See National Commission to Ensure a Strong Competitive Airline Industry,
supra note 93, at 22; see also Warner, supra note 10, at 281.
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ready hold a voting interest of up to 49%. In terms of reciproc-
ity, there are therefore no reasons for Congress not to raise the
foreign investment limits for EU investors.
D. COMPETITION
The debate finally deals with the issue of whether the current
legal regime imposes an obstacle to the development of liberal-
ized and open aviation markets or whether the protection of the
domestic aviation industry from foreign competition is still nec-
essary. The proponents of an amendment argue that the airline
industry and its customers, i.e., passengers and shippers, would
benefit from the access to fresh capital. Foreign capital could
enable U.S. carriers to compete more effectively with other car-
riers, both in the domestic market with other U.S. carriers and
in the international market. 10 6 The enhanced competition
would provide lower fares and more choices for customers.
Moreover, customers both in the U.S. and in Europe are accus-
tomed to the situation in other industries, such as in the energy
and telecommunications sectors, where after the privatization of
major providers and the liberalization of the markets the prices
declined and the quality of the services improved.
In contrast, some authors go so far as to voice fears that the
effects of changing the U.S. laws on ownership and control
"could be devastating to the U.S. economy."10' Closely linked is
the argument that heavily subsidized or even state-owned for-
eign airlines could invest in U.S. carriers and, due to their state
financial support, enjoy a competitive advantage over other U.S.
carriers, which have to seek funds in the private capital markets.
Carriers receiving a foreign investment could price below cost
and thereby distort the competition in the aviation market,
which might lead to a loss for other U.S. carriers and, eventually,
for the entire economy.0 At least in respect of EU carriers, the
anticompetitive effect of subsidies is not a valid argument any-
more. During the last years, the European Commission and the
European Court of Justice have focused on the enforcement of
the EU State aids regulations (Article 87, 88 EC),10 9 which allow
106 See Gjerset, supra note 66, at 173 ("stifles the economic development of an
industry").
107 Edwards, supra note 98, at 624.
108 Id. at 633.
109 Art. 92, 93 EC-Treaty in its former version; since the Treaty of Amsterdam
(1997 .J. (C 340), 1) has entered into force on May 1, 1999, the articles of the
EC-Treaty are renumerated and the European Court of Justice (EGJ) cites its
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state aids only under extraordinary circumstances, which regu-
larly do not apply to air carriers. As a result, the formerly com-
mon practice of many Member States to subsidize "flag carriers"
has ended and, moreover, the Commission has successfully put
pressure on the Member States to privatize their carriers.11 °
Many Member States, such as France, Italy, and Spain, have in
fact begun to privatize their carriers. In any event, the U.S.
could always limit ownership liberalization effects to carriers
that are not owned or controlled by their governments.
E. CONCLUSION
The usual objections raised against an amendment to the cur-
rent ownership and control requirements are, at least in the
U.S.-EU context, no longer convincing. However, it is unlikely
that the U.S. will change its foreign investment restrictions uni-
laterally in the foreseeable future. It is more likely that the
United States will suspend current foreign ownership and con-
trol restrictions through bilateral or multilateral agreements if
the other side is equally granting such rights, probably as a part
of an Open Skies agreement. The reciprocity issue is even more
imminent due to the size of the American market.'11 Under an
Open Skies agreement with a small European country, such as
the Netherlands, Dutch carriers are allowed to fly from the
Netherlands to any point within the U.S. In return, U.S. carriers
can also fly to any point in the Netherlands. Despite the legal
reciprocity and equal treatment of both parties, the factual dis-
parity in opportunities is obvious in cases where the bilateral
partner does not have a significant market to offer in exchange.
Therefore, it is much more attractive for the United States to
deal with the European Union as a whole in order to gain access
to the European market. It is far from clear whether or when
the EU Member States may be willing to accept the competence
of the Union to negotiate a multilateral air services
agreement. " 2
articles as they stand after May 1, 1999, with "EC"; see also Commission, Application
of Articles 92 and 93 of the EC Treaty and Article 61 of the EEA Agreement to State Aids in
the Aviation Sector, 1994 OJ. (C 350) 5.
o10 See Kirsten B6hmann, Privatisierungsdruck des Europarechts, at 134 et seq.
(2000) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Friedrich-Schiller-University, Jena, Ger-
many) (on file with author and Friedrich-Schiller-University).
IIl See Edwards, supra note 98, at 629.
It2 See infra § VI(C) (III).
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V. OWNERSHIP REQUIREMENTS IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION
A. BACKGROUND
After World War II, nationally owned and operated air carri-
ers, commonly know as "flag carriers," comprised the over-
whelming majority of the airline industry in Europe. Despite
the Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957, which was intended to pro-
mote the establishment of a common market among the Mem-
ber States, the air transport sector remained virtually unchanged
until the late 1980s. Although sea and air transportation were
both subject to the rules of the Treaty of Rome, Article 80 (2)
EC,113 it was not until the adoption of the Single European Act
in 1986114 that the European authorities eventually undertook
some efforts to open up the aviation market. The Single Euro-
pean Act set the date for achieving a Single European Market
without frontiers at 1992 and provided explicitly for the estab-
lishment of a Single European Market for air transport.'15
The landmark decision in respect to transportation was Nou-
velle Frontires, where the European Court of Justice (ECJ) held
that the general provisions of the EC-Treaty, in particular the
articles relating to competition, are applicable in the fields of air
and sea transport.' 6 The decision was significant because it en-
abled the European Authorities to intervene in the civil aviation
policies of the Member States. Beginning in 1986, the Euro-
pean Council enacted a three-phase program to liberalize the
air transportation industry within the Community. In 1987, the
Council approved the "First Package" of liberalization in the air
transport sector,11 7 and the "Second Package" '18 in 1989,
neither of which had a significant impact on the European air
services market.
113 Art. 84 (2) EC-Treaty in its former version.
114 Single European Act, 1987 OJ. (L 169), at 1 (effective July 1, 1987).
115 See id. at art (13).
116 ECJ, cases 209-213/84, Ministere Public v. Asjes (Nouvelles Frontieres),
1986 E.C.R. 1425 (1459); see also ECJ, case 66/86, Ahmed Saeed, 1989 E.C.R. 803.
117 See Council Regulation 3975/87, 1987 OJ. (L 374), 1; Council Regulation
3976/87, 1987 OJ. (L 374), 9, both setting forth procedures for applying the EC
antitrust rules to the aviation industry; Council Decision 87/601, 1987 O.J. (L
374), 12; Council Decision 87/602, 1987 OJ. (L 374), 19.
118 See Council Regulation 2342/90, 1990 0J. (L 217), at 1; Council Regula-
tion 2343/90, 1990 O.J. (L 217), at 8; Council Regulation 2344/90, 1990 0J. (L
217), at 15.
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In 1992, however, the Council adopted the "Third Package"'"19
consisting, among others, of two Regulations, Council Regula-
tion 2407/92 and 2408/92, which became effective on January
1, 1993. The "Third Package" effectively created for the first
time an almost completely open market for air services (airfare
approval, route and slot access, and capacity growth) within the
European Community, regardless of the bilateral agreements
between the Member States. This concept was very modern con-
sidering the fact that the first two packages were still based on
the idea of bilateral air services agreements between the Mem-
ber States. The 'Third Package' including Council Regulation
2407/92 on Licensing of Air Carriers provides exclusive rules
for the granting of operating licenses by the Member States and
changed the ownership requirements within the European
Union. Until 1992, each Member State had effectively reserved
its domestic air services market for carriers owned by that Mem-
ber State or its nationals. This situation was found to be incon-
sistent with one of the main principles of the Treaty of Rome,
the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of nationality,
laid down in Article 12 EC.120 After the 'Third Package', the
European regulatory regime no longer distinguishes between
domestic or international services within the European Commu-
nity market.12'
The non-discriminatory treatment of EU-carriers within the
European Union is even more visible because as of January 1,
1997, all EU carriers can freely operate scheduled and non-
scheduled air services within that market, including cabotage,
either directly through their own operations or indirectly by set-
ting up a subsidiary. 122 The new regime has thus established a
single, almost fully liberalized aviation market within the Euro-
pean Union, which is clearly distinguished from the bilateral re-
gime that governs the rest of the world.
119 See Council Regulation 2407/92, 1992 O.J. (L 240), 1; Council Regulation
2408/92, 1992 OJ. (L 240), 8; Council Regulation 2409/92, 1992 O.J. (L
240),15; Council Regulation 2410/92, 1992 O.J. (L 240), 18; Council Regulation
2411/92, 1992 O.J. (L 240), 19.
120 See EC Treaty, supra note 113, at art 6; John Balfour, Factortame: The Begin-
ning of the End for Nationalism in Air Transport?, 16 AIR LAw 251, 251 (1991).
121 See Council Regulation 2407/92, arts. 1(1), 3(3), 1992 OJ. (L 240), 1;
Council Regulation 2408/92, arts. 1(1), 3(1), 1992 O.J. (L 240), 8; Council Regu-
lation 2409/92, art. 1 (1), 1992 O.J. (L 240), 15.
122 See Council Regulation 2408/92, art. 3, 1992 O.J. (L 240), at 8.
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B. OWNERSHIP REQUIREMENTS: COMMUNITY OWNERSHIP
Like the United States, the Member States of the European
Union traditionally reserved their domestic air services market
(cabotage) for their 'flag carrier' or carriers that were either
state-owned or owned by their nationals. Council Regulation
2407/92 replaced the national statutes dealing with the granting
and maintaining of operating licenses in relation to air carriers
established in a Member State. 2 ' Due to the exclusive character
of the Regulation, the national license authorities cannot im-
pose requirements or conditions on applicants for air carrier li-
censes that go beyond those laid down in Regulation 2407/
92.124 The national authorities remain in charge of granting op-
erating licenses, as the Regulation did not establish a central Eu-
ropean Authority to perform these tasks.
Article 4 of Council Regulation 2407/92 sets forth the follow-
ing four fundamental requirements that an applicant for an air
carrier license must satisfy to be granted such a license:
1. the principal place of business must be located in the li-
censing Member State; 125
2. the main occupation of the carrier must be air
transportation; 126
3. the holder of the license must be owned and continue to
be owned directly or through a majority ownership by EU
nationals;127
4. the holder of the license must at all times be effectively
controlled by such EU nationals. 2
Regulation 2407/92 does not follow the traditional approach
of nationality of a single country, as set forth in Article 17 of the
Chicago Convention, but establishes an EU ownership system, as
required by the anti-discrimination provision of the EC-Treaty.
The Regulation allows airlines within the EU to be owned by
123 See Council Regulation 2407/92, supra note 94. The national regulations
continue to govern the licensing of non-EU airlines. See e.g., Article 3 of the
German LuftVG, which still imposes an ownership requirement and prevents
non-EU carriers from operating in Germany.
124 See Hans-Henning Mifihlke, Die Genehmigung deutscher Luftfahrtunternehmen
unter Anwendung der entsprechenden Verordnung (EWG) 2407/92, 44 ZLW 147, 158
(1995).
125 See Council Regulation 2407/92, supra note 94, at art. 4(1) (a).
126 See id. at art. 4(1) (b).
127 See id. at art. 4(2).
128 See id.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
nationals or companies from any Member State. 29 A grandfa-
ther provision allows carriers with outside control that have
been licensed before the enactment of the regulation to con-
tinue their operations. 130 The legislative purpose of the commu-
nity ownership requirement was not only to comply with the
requirements of the anti-discrimination provision, but also to
prevent third countries from unilaterally taking advantage of the
Community's liberalized international air services market. The
Commission stressed that the Regulation protects the interests
of Community air carriers in an environment where they do not
enjoy unrestricted traffic rights in third countries. 1
1. Majority Ownership
Pursuant to Article 4 (2) of the Regulation, an applicant for
an air carrier operating license must be owned, and continue to
be owned, directly or through a majority ownership, by EU na-
tionals.1 12 In its Swissair/Sabena decision, the Commission took
the view that the majority ownership requirement is met if at
least 50% plus one share is owned by EU nationals.'33 This deci-
sion was the first where the Commission had the opportunity to
comment on Council Regulation 2407/92 and to clarify some of
the interpretative issues. In 1995, the Belgian State and Swissair
entered into an agreement according to which Swissair acquired
49.5% of the equity of Sabena, the Belgian flag carrier. 4 The
Commission did not challenge whether Sabena was in compli-
ance with the majority ownership requirement.3 5
Moreover, the Commission determined that it is not relevant
whether the shares of the 'majority owner' are held by a single
EU national or by a dispersed group of shareholders-so long as
129 The regulation's introduction of community ownership made it possible for
European Airlines to acquire majority stakes in other EU airlines, such as British
Airways taking over the French airline TAT.
130 See Council Regulation 2407/92, art. 4(3) (b), supra note 94; Council Regu-
lation 2343/90, supra note 118; Annex I (airlines recognized for the grandfather
provision are SAS, Britannia Airways, and Monarch Airways).
131 Commission Decision, supra note 88.
132 Council Regulation 2407 / 92, art. 4(2), supra note 94.
133 Id. It should be noted, however, that the Commission does not have the
authority to interpret a Community source of law, since this competence is left
with the European Court of Justice. See EC Treaty art. 234(a) EC. Thus, the
interpretation exercised by the Commission cannot be considered final.
134 Commission Decision 95/404/EC, supra note 94.
135 Id.
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they are EU nationals and their interests add up to a majority. 1 6
However, the distribution of the shares between non-EU share-
holders has to be taken into account in assessing compliance
with the effective control requirement. Even a major block of
shares, which does not constitute a majority, may nevertheless
give its owner effective control over the carrier if the rest of the
shares are dispersed.
13 7
The Commission further commented on the term "owner-
ship" and stated that, in regard to a company, it only referred to
a participation in the capital of the company, not to voting
rights. Consequently, "Article 4 (2) of the Regulation refers to a
concept of ownership based on the notion of equity capital,
[which] implies the right to participate in decisions affecting
the management of the company [as well as] the right to share
in the residual profits or the residual assets upon liquidation."'' 38
Thus, preferred stock, even without voting rights, would count
as ownership interests, whereas convertible bonds would not
count prior to actual conversion into stock.' 39 Therefore, as in
the United States, foreign investors can hold a total equity inter-
est of up to 49%, including voting and non-voting rights, and
debts are generally not considered to constitute control.
2. Effective Control
Pursuant to Article 4 (2), holders of an operating license must
be effectively controlled by EU nationals. The notion of EU or
Community ownership not only requires a majority ownership
by Member States and/or their nationals, but also that such
Member States or nationals effectively control the undertaking
at all times.' 4° Pursuant to Article 2 (g) of the Regulation, effec-
tive control is defined as
a relationship constituted by rights, contracts, or any other
means which, either separately or jointly and having regard to
the considerations of fact or law involved, confer the possibility
of directly or indirectly exercising a decisive influence on an un-
dertaking, in particular by:
a) the right to use all or part of the assets of an undertaking;
136 Id.
137 Id. at 24.
138 Id.; Berend Crans and Onno Rijsdijk, EC Aviation Scene, Commission Decisions
in Swissair/Sabena, 21 AIR & SPAcE L. 33, 35 (1996).
139 Rosengarten and Stephan, supra note 9, at 1379.
140 See Council Regulation 2407/92, art. 4(2), supra note 94.
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b) rights or contracts which confer a decisive influence on the
composition, voting or decisions of the bodies of an under-
taking or otherwise confer a decisive influence on the run-
ning of the business of the undertaking.141
The Commission stated that the notion of effective control
must be interpreted and applied in the light of the objective of
safeguarding the interests of the Community's air transport in-
dustry, preventing third country carriers from taking full advan-
tage, on a unilateral basis, of the liberalized EU aviation market.
The Commission stated that the ultimate decision-making
power in the management of the carrier must remain with EU
nationals. They must be able, either directly or indirectly, to
have the final say on such key issues as the carrier's business
plan, its annual budget or any major investments or cooperation
projects. 14 2 This regularly includes the power to appoint a ma-
jority of the board of directors or its equivalents (such as the
supervisory committee in Germany), who have the right to ap-
point the management. 4 3 Moreover, effective control is not in-
evitably linked with the majority interest, as a minority
shareholder may be able to effectively control a carrier when the
rest of the shareholders are widely dispersed. The licensing au-
thority must also examine whether there are any provisions in
the articles of incorporation or alliances between shareholders
that prevent the EU shareholders from independently control-
ling the company, such as voting alliances, supermajority voting,
or the right of a minority shareholder to block majority deci-
sions. 144 Finally, the control requirements in Article 4 (2) of the
Regulation excludes the formation of a trust with a EU national
as a trustee because the carrier must be owned directly or
through a majority ownership by EU nationals, which ultimately
points to the nationality of the beneficiary. 145 In contrast, eco-
nomic dependence through supply contracts or debt is gener-
ally not considered to constitute effective control, unless the
underlying agreement provides the contracting partner, such as
a bank, with special rights that equal a substantial equity
interest. 146
141 Id.
142 Commission Decision 95/404/EC, supra note 94.
143 Karl Stefan Eisermann, Grundlagen des Gemeinsamen Europdischen Lufiverkehr-
smarktes, at 191 (1995).
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The Commission's interpretation of the notion of 'effective
control' closely resembles the DOT's view on 'actual control', as
required by the Federal Aviation Act. In both systems, the li-
censing authority must determine whether a foreign interest is
able to exercise actual or effective control in any given form.
Both systems, absent extraordinary circumstances, do not view
debt as a relevant factor in evaluating control. However, unlike
the DOT, the Commission does not distinguish between voting
equity and non-voting equity. Both the voting and the non-vot-
ing equity combined constitute the majority ownership interest
that must be held by EU nationals. The Commission does not
approve a foreign non-voting interest that exceeds 49%, but also
does not object to a foreign voting interest of up to 49%, unless
the investor can exercise effective control by different means.
However, the question arises whether this deviation from the
numerical requirements of the U.S. regime constitutes a sub-
stantial difference between the two systems or whether they in
fact present more or less identical requirements. The only iden-
tified difference is that the EU allows a voting equity interest of
up to 49%. Both systems prohibit effective or actual control of
the carrier by foreign interests. Consequently, in both systems
the contractual rights of the foreign minority shareholders, even
if they hold 49% in voting equity, must be formed in a way that
the foreign interest is not able to control the company. The
crucial factor in determining the ownership status in both the
U.S. and the European system is not the permissible voting in-
terest, but the actual control situation in the company, namely
who is able to exercise decisive influence on the carrier. In the
vast majority of cases a voting interest of 49% is likely to enable
its holder to exercise such influence, in particular if the rest of
the shares are widely dispersed. Therefore, in those cases, even
with a higher numerical requirement, a foreign voting equity of
49% in a EU carrier would not be permissible. One can there-
fore conclude that the U.S. and the EU system are not as differ-
ent as their numerical ownership requirements facially suggest.
3. Publicly Traded Companies and Privatization
The general trend of privatization, which can be identified
not only in the aviation sector, but also in many other sectors in
the EU economy, such as telecommunications and energy, leads
to the privatization of many "state carriers." Today, the major
European carriers-British Airways, Lufthansa, Air France, and
723
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Alitalia-are fully or at least partially privatized. 14 7 Air carriers
that are public companies will inevitably be owned by a large
number of individuals and institutional investors such as mutual
funds. The major European carriers already quoted on the
stock exchanges-British Airways, KLM, and Lufthansa-and
presumably they will not remain the only large European carri-
ers publicly traded. Because ownership in a publicly traded
company is generally more diffuse, the nationality of these carri-
ers necessarily becomes less certain, and it might at some point
become difficult for them to fulfill continuously the require-
ment of being substantially owned and effectively controlled by
EU nationals. Pursuant to Article 4 (5) of the Regulation, a car-
rier holding a Community air carrier license shall at all times be
able to demonstrate to the Member State responsible for the
operating license that it meets the requirements of Article 4 (2).
Air carriers are therefore required to keep track of their owner-
ship and control structures.
Applying a restrictive interpretation of Article 4 (5) might
cause serious problems for publicly traded carriers trying to
meet such a request. Some authors have argued that a prag-
matic approach should be taken: if an air carrier is a publicly
traded company that is incorporated and resident in a Member
State, it should be presumed that nationals of Member States
own a majority of its share capital unless there are clear indica-
tions to the contrary. 148 The major argument in favor of such a
broad interpretation is that the Regulation cannot be expected
to run contrary to the concept of air carriers as public compa-
nies. Moreover, it can be argued that the company's effective
control is not in jeopardy because the ownership is so diffuse
that the individual owners, regardless of their nationality, are
not able to exercise jointly any substantial control over the com-
pany.149 However, neither the Commission nor the European
Court of Justice has yet taken a position on this issue. The con-
tinuing privatization of European air carriers that are publicly
traded makes it likely that the issue of "effective control" will
become a crucial aspect in any determination of a carrier's
nationality.
147 On the Lufthansa privatization see Nikolai von Ruckteschell, Die
Privatisierung der Deutschen Lufthansa A G - Von der 6ffentlich-rechtlichen zurprivatrech-
tlichen Zielsetzung in Unternehmen der 6ffentlichen Hand, ZGR 1996, 364.
148 Rosengarten and Stephan, supra note 139 at 9.
149 Rigas Dogas, Relaxing Airline Ownership and Investment Rules, 21 AiR & SPACE
L. 267, 268 (1996).
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To solve the dilemma between the principle of freely transfer-
able stock and the ownership requirements of the Regulation,
the German legislature regulated the traceability of shareholder
nationality in the Aviation Compliance Documenting Act
(ACDA) before the German government disposed of its remain-
ing shares in Lufthansa in the 1997 global share offering."' 0 Ac-
cording to the ACDA, shares in an air carrier in the form of a
stock corporation ('Aktiengesellschaft') must be registered
shares, with transfer restrictions, rather than freely transferable
bearer shares, and the shareholders are required to give infor-
mation to the company regarding their nationality. In addition,
the carrier has increased rights to re-acquire its own shares and
to issue shares out of an authorized capital, excluding the right
of certain shareholders to buy newly issued shares. Finally, as a
means of last resort, the management has the right to request
shareholders whose ownership may be in conflict with the car-
rier maintaining its operating license and air traffic rights, to
dispose of their shares. 151
4. Nationality of the Management
As seen above, the law of the United States contains require-
ments as to the nationality of an air carrier's management. 152
Regulation 2407/92 does not contain any explicit requirement
regarding the nationality of the management. It can be argued
that the notion of "effective control" by nationals of Member
States requires the management of the carrier to be controlled
by these nationals. However, the notion of "effective control" as
defined by Article 2 (g) of the Regulation clearly reflects the
concept of external control, which is normally exercised by the
stockholders of a company as opposed to control through man-
agement. 5 Therefore, the Regulation must be interpreted to
150 Act for procuring proof of ownership position and control of air carriers
for maintaining the air traffic operating license and the air traffic rights (Aviation
Compliance Documenting Act).
151 British Airways and KLM have chosen similar ways, see also von Rucktes-
chell, supra note 148, at 372. BA maintains a special registry for shares held by
foreigners and requires its shareholders to give notice when they sell their shares
to foreigners.
152 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(15) (1994); see also § 3(1) of the German LuftVG,
which requires a majority of directors or general partners of the carrier to be
German nationals.
153 Rosengarten and Stephan, supra note 9, at 137.
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mean that the nationality of the carrier's management shall be
irrelevant in determining that carrier's nationality.154
5. Group Structure
If the carrier belongs to a group of companies, the question
arises whether only the ultimate holding company must be con-
trolled by nationals of the Member States or whether all of the
upper level companies must fulfill that requirement, namely
whether they too must be domiciled within the EU and con-
trolled by EU nationals. Since the wording of the Regulation
does not give any clear indication as to the nationality of inter-
mediary companies, one can assume that it is sufficient that the
ultimate holding company be in compliance with the
Regulation. 1 55
6. Principal Place of Business
In addition to the criteria of substantial EU-ownership and ef-
fective EU-control, Regulation 2407/92 also requires the carrier
to have its principal place of business within the EU. This provi-
sion excludes carriers from the EU-market that are substantially
owned and controlled by EU carriers, but have their principal
place of business outside the EU, such as Aerolfneas Argentinas.
Consequently, it is impossible for a non-EU air carrier to sell out
to a EU carrier or to buy a majority share of a EU carrier in
order to benefit from the liberalized air traffic market within the
Union. In other words, despite the fact that Iberia has acquired
a majority ownership in Aerolfneas Argentinas, the Argentine
air carrier is not entitled to operate within the EU unless it es-
tablishes its main place of business within the EU.
Pointing to the trend towards Open Skies agreements and
free market conditions, in particular within the European
Union, some authors conclude that the requirement of substan-
tial ownership and effective control should be abandoned as the
link between a state and the air carrier and be replaced by the
criterion of the main place of business.156 This proposal bears
some similarities to the concept of "flags of convenience," which
is already commonly known in maritime law for decades. In
maritime law, ship owners can transfer the registration of their
154 See Eisermann, supra note 143, at 193 for a different interpretation.
15 Rosengarten and Stephan, supra note 9, at 138.
156 Henri Wassenbergh, The 'Sixth'Freedom Revisited, 21 AIR & SPACE L. 285, 292
(1996).
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vessels to more favorable countries of registry in order to avoid
burdensome taxes, highly unionized workforces, or less strin-
gent safety requirements. 157 Under the current regime, an air
carrier cannot easily transfer its registry because the vast major-
ity of countries require that the carrier be substantially owned
and effectively controlled by nationals of their state. Under a
regime governed by the criterion of "main place of business," it
would be possible for an air carrier to transfer its registration if
it would also transfer its main place of business. However, there
are major differences between aviation and maritime law. In the
maritime sector, carriers are not restricted to certain traffic
routes that are assigned to them by their country of registry.
Any ship owner is allowed to travel freely on the high seas with-
out any restrictions. In contrast, in aviation an air carrier can
only exploit traffic rights that are designated to that carrier by
the carrier's state of registry. Therefore, the decision what
country to choose as the country of registry in the aviation sec-
tor could not be governed by factors such as costs or safety stan-
dards, but primarily by the factor of whether the country is able
to designate attractive and profitable traffic rights. A situation
like in the maritime sector is therefore unlikely to develop in
the aviation sector.
It should be noted, however, that problems may arise during
the transition period when some bilateral agreements have been
changed to the notion of "principle place of business" while
others maintain the ownership and control requirement. This
fact pattern could lead to a situation where a carrier is substan-
tially owned by nationals of state A but registered in state B
where it has its main place of business, e.g., Aerolfneas Argenti-
nas, which is registered in Argentina but owned by Iberia. As
already indicated above, it is uncertain whether both Argentina
and Spain could designate Aerolineas Argentinas under their re-
spective bilateral agreements. 158
Despite this proposal and other proposals on how to adapt
the aviation industry to the needs of a liberalized world econ-
omy, it seems as if many countries still view air transportation as
an industry of national importance and are reluctant to open
their markets to foreign competition. It is therefore likely that
the ownership and control requirements will continue to re-
157 See infra §VI (A) (2).
158 Wassenbergh, supra note 157, at 293 (arguing in favor of the designation by
two countries).
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main the decisive criteria for determining the nationality of an
air carrier in the near future.15 9
C. EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
Although the liberalization of the air traffic market has signifi-
cantly relaxed the ownership requirements within the EU and
thereby improved the intracommunity competition, non-EU
countries have not yet recognized the changes. The traditional
ownership and control requirements remain in many bilateral
treaties between Member States and third countries and still en-
title the latter to withhold or revoke an operating permit if a
carrier is not substantially owned and effectively controlled by
the contracting Member State and/or its nationals. Hence, if a
carrier from Member State A is taken over by a carrier from
Member States B, a third country could withhold or revoke its
operating license and prevent the carrier from exploiting the
traffic rights granted to carriers of Member State A. The poten-
tial for EU carriers to build up a large market through mergers
within Europe is therefore still limited. 60 However, it should be
noted that some Member States have recently entered into bilat-
eral agreements that take into account the EU ownership and
prevent third countries from objecting to the nationality of a
designated carrier, which is owned by EU nationals. For in-
stance, the bilateral agreement between Germany and Brunei
explicitly states that either party cannot object to the rights
granted under the bilateral agreement if a designated carrier'i'
not substantially owned or effectively controlled by nationals of
the other side. The provision further grants Brunei the right to
challenge the right of a carrier designated by Germany if the
carrier is not able to demonstrate that it is substantially owned
and effectively controlled by EU nationals. 161
As described above, the majority of the bilateral air services
agreements of the Member States contain traditional nationality
159 Id. at 291.
16o E.g., Virgin Atlantic has acquired a 90% stake in a Belgian airline called
EBA. As a British-owned airline EBA cannot fly to a third country as long as the
bilateral treaty between Belgium and the third country contains the traditional
nationality clause.
161 E.g., the air transport agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany
and Brunei Darussalam, German Federal Gazette (BGBI.) 1994, 11-3670, Art. 3
(4). The last provision refers to Council Regulation 2407/92, art. 4(5), supra
note 94, which requires a carrier holding a Community air carrier license to be at
all times able to demonstrate to the Member State responsible for the operating
license that it meets the requirements of Art. 4 (2).
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clauses that may violate the EC Treaty, as they discriminate
against other EU carriers on the basis of nationality and under-
mine one of the fundamental rights, granted by the EC Treaty,
the right of establishment. Article 49 of EC Treaty grants the
right of establishment in other Member States to nationals of
any Member State and requires the Member States to allow the
establishment on the same conditions as those, which they apply
to companies incorporated in their countries. In the aviation
sector, the right of establishment is laid down in Council Regu-
lation 2407/92, which grants EU nationals the right to own and
operate a carrier in each Member State. It is obvious that there
is a clear conflict between the traditional nationality clause in
bilateral agreements and the right, which EU nationals have
under the Council Regulation. Article 307 EC protects agree-
ments entered into prior to January 1, 1958, which remain valid
regardless of contrary Community law. These agreements, how-
ever, represent only a small fraction of the bilateral air services
agreements between the current sixteen Member States and
third countries. It is uncertain whether Article 307 EC also ap-
plies to agreements that were originally entered into before
1956 but amended thereafter, or to agreements that were cre-
ated after 1956 but at a time when the Community had no exclu-
sive competence to negotiate certain agreements. 162 Moreover,
there is no common understanding whether the Community has
the right to negotiate air services agreements for the EU. The
Commission claims to have exclusive competence to negotiate
and conclude new bilateral air services agreements between
third parties and the EU under Article 307 EC. 163 However,
neither the Council nor the European Court of Justice have yet
approved such competence.
Finally, it remains unclear whether and to what extent the
Member States are required to eliminate provisions that are not
in compliance with Article 49 EC and not protected by Article
307 EC. Advocate-General Lenz has taken a strong position and
demanded that a bilateral agreement has to be denounced "if
162 Left open by the ECJ, see joined Italian Republic v. Commission cases 3, 4,
6/76, Kramer and others, 1976 E.C.R. 1279; case 41/83, British Telecommunica-
tions, 1985 E.C.R. 873 (889 seq. note 36 seq.); Stefan Karl Eisermann, Die
Luflfahrtauflenkompetenz der Gemeinschaft, EuZW 1995, 331 takes the view that those
agreements are also valid.
163 Art. 234 EC-Treaty in its former version, see supra note 113; see jcIrgen
Erdmenger, Hans von der Groeben, Jochen Thiesing, and Claus-Dieter
Ehlermann, Kommentar zum EU-/EG-Vertrag, Band 1 (1999), Art. 84 note 93.
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the non-member country is not prepared to amend the agree-
ment." '164 Since the European Court of Justice has not taken a
position on that issue either, it can only be concluded that the
Member States are required to take all reasonable efforts to re-
negotiate bilateral agreements, as indicated in the wording of
Article 307 EC, in order to replace the traditional nationality
with the appropriate "Community ownership" clause.16
Despite the current uncertainties regarding the external rela-
tions of the EU in the aviation sector, it nevertheless seems clear
that for the European Union and its Member States the future
of international aviation lies in multilateral agreements with
third countries that accept the "Community nationality."
Whether the Commission can negotiate such agreements in the
near future, however, remains doubtful, as some Member States
still fear that their sovereignty and national interests would be
subordinated were they to allow the Commission to negotiate on
their behalf. Considering the multiple Open Skies agreement
between the United States and many EU Member States and the
similar size of the markets, one can assume that changes will first
occur in the transatlantic EU-U.S. aviation area.
D. CONCLUSION
The evaluation of the ownership and control requirements in
the U.S. and the EU system has shown that, despite the numeri-
cal disparity, both systems prohibit effective or actual control by
the foreign investor and view the question of control as the cru-
cial factor. There are many similarities as to how the authorities
in charge, namely the DOT and the European Commission, de-
termine whether a carrier is able to maintain its citizenship
status.
VI. OWNERSHIP REQUIREMENTS IN U.S.
MARITIME LAWS
Following World War II, the United States Merchant Marine
had the largest private merchant fleet in the world. Since then,
the private merchant fleet has shrunk considerably and today
the U.S. is no longer a significant player in international ship-
164 See cases 209-213/84, Minist4re Public v. Asjes, 1986 E.C.R. 1425, 1453
(1986).
165 John Balfour, European Community External Aviation Relations - The Question
of Competence, 21 AIR & SPACE L. 2, 3 (1996).
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ping.166 In 1948, 716 vessels were carrying the U.S. flag, close to
one-half the world's shipping fleet. In 1995, less than 150 vessels
were flying the American flag on international routes167 and the
United States controls only 5% of the world's fleet.16 U.S. carri-
ers encounter diverse problems when competing against for-
eign-flagged vessels, and these problems have contributed to the
steady decline of the U.S. merchant maritime fleet.
A. THE SITUATION OF THE U.S. MERCHANT MARINE FLEET
1. United States Registry Requirements
Every commercial vessel is attributed a nationality, namely the
nationality of its registry. The United States has one of the most
restrictive registration requirements of any maritime nation.
Vessel registration is governed by the Vessel Documentation Act
of 1980. In order to qualify for a registration, a vessel must be
owned by an individual who is a citizen of the United States or
by an entity, all of whose members are citizens of the United
States.169 Additionally, for vessels registered in the United
States, only 25% of the unlicensed crew may be non-U.S. citi-
zens, and only U.S. citizens may serve as high-level
crewmembers, such as captains and officers.
2. Flags of Convenience
The costs of compliance with the requirements of registration
in the United States are very high and have therefore added to
the decline of the fleet registered in the United States. Ameri-
can ship owners have decided to reflag their vessels, i.e., to
change the registry of a ship to a different country ("flag of con-
venience"). Other countries have less strict registration require-
ments and permit the registration of almost all ships owned by
166 H.R. Rep. No. 104-229 (1995).
167 S. Rep. No. 104-167 (1995). This number presumably has further decline
since three of the largest container companies, APL Ltd., Lukes Bros. Steamship
Co. and the international services of Sea-Land Service Inc., were sold to foreign
companies, see infra VI(B) (3).
68 See Testimony of Warren L. Dean, Testimony Before the House Committee
on Ways and Means, Hearing on Impact of U.S. Tax Rules on International Com-
petitiveness, June 30, 1999, <http://www.house.gov/waysmeans/fullcomm/106
cong/6-30-99/6-30dean.htm>; the EU fleet, in contrast, controls approximately
20% of the world's fleet, see Thomas Oppermann, Europarecht (1991), at 524 note
1350.
169 46 U.S.C. § 12102 (1997).
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foreign nationals ("open registry").17° One major advantage of
reflagging is that a ship owned by a U.S. citizen can employ for-
eign seamen and can pay foreign, i.e., lower, wages, thereby
avoiding the high costs of unionized maritime labor in high
wage countries, such as the United States. In addition, the work-
ing conditions in flag of convenience countries are generally
more favorable to ship owners. 171 Because crewing costs can to-
tal as much as half of the ship's operating costs, ship owners can
realize substantially higher profits by using a flag of convenience
or, in some cases, remain at least competitive.
A second major reason for utilizing flags of convenience is
that in 'popular' countries of registry, such as Liberia and Pan-
ama, shipping operations that take place outside the country of
registry are untaxed.1 72 Hence, foreign flagged ships are not re-
quired to pay taxes either in the country of registry nor in the
United States, even if they operate their businesses to and from
the United States.173 In contrast, U.S. carriers must comply with
the U.S. Tax Code, which causes significant disparities between
U.S.-flag and foreign-flag vessels. While foreign-flagged ships
often enjoy shipping income tax exemptions, deferral devices,
and accelerated depreciation, or do not even pay income taxes
at all, the U.S. Tax Code imposes high income taxes on U.S.
maritime carriers.'7 4 The United States corporate income tax
rate is 35%, though most companies pay a lower rate through
various deductions. Unlike the U.S., countries in the European
Union and other maritime nations have adopted tax policies
170 E.g., in Liberia, corporations incorporated in Liberia qualify as a Liberian
national; thus, any citizenship requirement can be circumvented by setting up a
corporation. See H. Edwin Anderson III, The Nationality of Ships and Flags of Conve-
nience: Economics, Politics, and Alternatives, 21 TUL. MAR. L.J. 139, 155 (1996).
171 See Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572, 574, 100 S.
Ct. 800, 63 L. Ed. 2d 36 (1980).
172 Even maritime nations that are not considered flag of convenience coun-
tries, such as European countries, have frequently adopted tax policies that en-
able their shippers to compete in international shipping.
173 E.g., seventeen major cruise lines benefit from the tax loopholes in the U.S.
and pay virtually no taxes although most of their passengers are from the U.S.,
TODAY WEEKLY, March 18, 1999. One of the largest, Carnival Corp. headquar-
tered in Miami and incorporated in Panama, reported only $6 million on taxes
while having a pretax income of about $672 million in 1997. The taxes paid
reflected work the company did in the United States.
174 SeeJoint statement of different U.S. shipping companies, Prompt Enactment
of Legislation to Revitalize the United States-Flag Liner Fleet, Hearing Before the Panel
on the Merchant Marine Committee on National Security, 104th Cong. (1995),
available in 1995 WL 155094, at 7.
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and other means that allow their shipping companies to com-
pete with flag of convenience ships.
Another major tax burden was caused by the 1986 repeal of
Subpart F of the 1956 Internal Revenue Code175 , which permit-
ted U.S. owners of foreign-flag ships to defer current U.S. taxa-
tion of operating income that was reinvested in shipping assets.
These provisions allowed U.S. ship owners to offset earnings
from foreign operations against losses or investments in domes-
tic operations. The repeal was heavily promoted by the Ameri-
can maritime unions that wanted to prevent U.S. owners from
operating foreign-flagged ships. However, the unions' desire to
oppose a U.S.-owned convenience fleet has resulted in the fur-
ther decline of the entire U.S. fleet.17 6 Moreover, despite the
repeal of Subpart F, "the tax revenues have decreased from $90
million per year before 1975, which equals $250 million today,
to less than $50 million. 1 77 In 1997, a proposal to reinstate the
exemption was introduced but has not yet been acted upon.
1 7 1
More recently, ship owners have also sought to utilize flags of
convenience to avoid potentially high liability exposure for mar-
itime disasters, such as major oil spills. It is therefore not sur-
prising that flags of convenience, due to their reportedly less
strict safety standards, are often linked with major oil pollution,
as some of the most devastating spills involved vessels registered
under such flags, e.g., the Panamanian registered Amoco Cadiz
in 1978.
Overall, it is estimated that U.S. ship owner costs are two-to-
three times higher than those for reputable foreign-flag own-
ers.17 9 Hence, reflagging under foreign flags such as Panama,
Liberia or Greece could be financially very beneficial.
B. THE U.S. STATUTORY SCHEME
In order to encourage the maintenance of a merchant marine
with U.S.-flag ships and American personnel and to support the
shipbuilding industry, Congress has taken a number of steps.
Like in the aviation sector, two main policies can be identified:
175 Tax Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, § 1221(c) (1986).
176 Before Subpart F was extended to shipping in 1976/1986, U.S. corpora-
tions owned or controlled more than 25% of the world's fleet; now the figure has
declined to 5%. See Testimony of Warren L. Dean, supra note 171.
177 See id.
178 Shipping Income Reform Act of 1997, H.R. 2684, 105th Cong. (1997), rein-
troduced as H.R. 3730, 105th Cong. (1998) by Rep. E. Clay Shaw, Jr. of Florida.
179 See Ken Cottrill, Wanted: U.S.-Flag Ships, TRAFFIC WORLD, Oct. 18, 1999.
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national defense and national economic interest. The United
States as well as the countries of Western Europe have tradition-
ally considered it very important to maintain registries of com-
mercial vessels so as to enjoy access to those ships in the event of
war or national emergencies. A substantial merchant fleet is
supposed to ensure an adequate sea-lift capability for the car-
riage of personnel and equipment, as the military merchant
marine does not have the ability to carry out these tasks itself."1 0
In 1920, Congress enacted the Merchant Marine Act, which
exclusively reserves the United States domestic trade (cabotage)
for vessels built in the United States and owned and crewed by
its citizens. The 1936 Act established a number of programs de-
signed to support the U.S. shipping industry to compete effec-
tively in international trade against vessels constructed and
manned abroad. The Maritime Security Act of 1996 replaced
some of the subsidies provided for in the 1936 Act in order to
protect further and support the U.S. fleet against foreign
competition.
1. The Merchant Marine Act of 1920
The Merchant Marine Act of 1920, also known as the Jones
Act,18' reserves the United States domestic trade for vessels that
are built in U.S. shipyards, owned and crewed by U.S. citizens,
and operated under the U.S. flag, i.e., registered in the U.S. As
described above, in order to register a ship in the United States
or its territories, officers must be U.S. citizens, and 75% of its
stock must be owned by U.S. citizen. Domestic trade is defined
as trade "between points in the United States, including Dis-
tricts, Territories, and possessions thereof embraced within
coastwise laws"-in other words, cabotage. The rationale of this
Act was to protect the national fleet against lower-cost foreign
competition by excluding foreign ships from the domestic mar-
ket. Hence, all United States shippers that operate exclusively
in the domestic trades incur equivalent costs in constructing
and operating their fleets. Apart from the requirement that the
ships must be built in the U.S., the Jones Act resembles the regu-
lation of the Federal Aviation Act for cabotage. 18 2
180 See Anderson, supra note 173, at 144; see also Victor G. Hanson and John V.
Berry, The Diminution of the Merchant Marine: A National Security Risk, 74 U. DET.
MERCY L. REv. 465, 481-482 (1997).
181 46 U.S.C. § 883 (1994).
182 Warren L. Dean, Jones Act Reflects Fundamentals of US Legal System, J. OF COM.,
Dec. 1, 1998 at 54.
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2. The Merchant Marine Act of 1936
The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 (hereafter the Merchant
Marine Act)"18 was intended to foster the development and en-
courage the maintenance of a large and effective merchant
marine capable of meeting the Nation's future commercial and
military needs.184 The Act authorizes the U.S. maritime agency,
the Maritime Administration (Marad), to grant subsidies to en-
able vessels that are built in the United States and staffed with
U.S. personnel to compete effectively in the foreign trade. In
order to promote the construction of vessels in U.S. shipyards, a
carrier could receive "construction-differential subsidies"
(CDS),185 if in return it agreed that it will operate that vessel
exclusively in the foreign trade. Constructing ships in American
shipyards was, and continues to be, much more expensive that
constructing ships in foreign shipyards. 86 Under the CDS pro-
gram, the government could pay up to half the construction
costs of a vessel built in the United States.18 7 The "operating
differential subsidies" (ODS)1 88 were intended to enable U.S.
vessels to successfully compete with all foreign-flagged vessels
that can be crewed and maintained at lower costs. 189 The do-
mestic trading restrictions expire when either the ship owner
pays back the unamortized subsidy or the subsidy becomes fully
amortized at the end of the economic life of the ship.1 90
Although these subsidies have offset a number of costs associ-
ated with operating a U.S.-flag vessel in international trade,
American shipping subsidies were unreliable and, as labor and
other maintenance costs continued to rise, not sufficient to en-
183 46 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq. (1994).
-84 46 U.S.C. § 1101 (1994); Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil. Co., 444
U.S. 572, 584, 100 S. Ct. 800, 807, 63 L. Ed. 2d 36 (1980).
185 46 U.S.C § 1151 (1994).
186 See Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil. Co., 444 U.S. 572, 574, 100 S.
Ct. 800, 63 L. Ed. 2d 36 (1980).
187 46 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994).
188 46 U.S.C. §1171 (1994).
189 46 U.S.C. § 1156 (1994). It granted two exceptions to the obligation to
operate the vessel exclusively in the foreign trade: first, a subsidized ship was
permitted to operate in a domestic trade incident to a bona fide foreign voyage,
meaning that the ship is allowed to travel in the domestic trade on one leg to a
foreign voyage; second, the ship may operate in the domestic trade if the Secre-
tary of Transportation has consented to a temporary transfer of the vessel to the
domestic trade.
190 OSG Bulk Ships, Inc. v. U.S., 921 F.Supp. 812, 816 (D.C. 1996) (holding
that the domestic trading restrictions end after 25 years for dry cargo ships and
after 20 years for liquid bulk carrier).
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able the U.S. fleet to compete effectively with foreign ship liners.
For many shipping companies the only way to remain financially
viable was to escape the U.S. regime for less restrictive conve-
nience registries.
3. The Maritime Security Act of 1996
In 1995, it appeared that the U.S. fleet would vanish entirely
unless decisive steps were taken to support the merchant
marine. The ODS subsidies provided for by the 1936 Merchant
Marine Act were no longer available, since the last contracts
benefiting from them expired in 1998.191 It was the common
understanding that the U.S.-flag presence in international trade
was likely to disappear unless a maritime bill would be enacted
that sufficiently supported the U.S. fleet. Hence, in 1996 the
House and Senate passed the Maritime Security Act192 to re-
place, even though to a smaller degree, the ODS program of the
1936 Act. Major beneficiaries of the new subsidy program are
the U.S. maritime workers, as the subsidies principally help to
offset the higher costs of U.S. crews.
Under the Maritime Security Act, 47 U.S. ships are subsidized
over the next decade. Unlike the Merchant Maritime Act, the
Maritime Security Program grants a flat fee per vessel and does
not require certain specified trade routes. Ship owners received
$2.3 million per vessel in 1996 and $2.1 million per vessel for
each following year through fiscal year 2007. In return, carriers
must participate in the Maritime Security Fleet. In the event of
war or national emergency, carriers must make their participat-
ing vessels available for the use of the DOD.1 93
Currently, the Maritime Security Program provides nearly
$100 million in subsidies for U.S.-flagged vessels.' 94 Remarkably,
most of these vessels are ultimately owned by foreign compa-
nies-many of the once U.S. companies that participate in the
program have since been sold to foreign companies. Just after
the enactment of the program, the second-largest U.S.-flag
container ship operator, APL Ltd., was sold to the Singapore-
191 H.R. Rep. No. 104-229 (1995).
192 Maritime Security Act, Pub. L. No. 104-239, 110 Stat. 3118 (1996); President
Clinton signing the bill stated: "[The Act] will ensure that the United States will
continue to have American Flag ships crewed by loyal American citizen merchant
mariners to meet our Nation's economic and sealift defense requirements", avail-
able in 1996 WL 576962.
193 Id. at § 2.
194 It's Pure Clinton, J. OF COM., Feb. 2, 2000, at EP.
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based Neptune Orient Lines (NOL). In 1998, Lykes Bros.
Steamship Co., another large U.S.-flag carrier, was sold to a Ca-
nadian company; and in 1999, CSX Corp. sold the international
services of Sea-Land Service Inc., the largest U.S.-flag container
ship operator, to the Danish A.P. Moller Group, the parent of
the Maersk Line. Despite the change in ownership, the Mari-
time Administration approved the transfer of the subsidies to
the new owners that continue to operate the ships under the
U.S. flag.195 The method by which this is all accomplished is:
the buyers regularly set up U.S.-owned trusts that operate the
vessels for the foreign owner and employ and direct captain and
crew. Evidently, the Maritime Administration believes that the
creation of a straw-man U.S. trust is sufficient to keep ownership
and control in U.S. hands, even though the vessel is presumably
time chartered exclusively to its foreign owner that directs
where, when, and how the vessel operates.
After the transfer of Sea-Land's 15 subsidized ships, only three
of the 47 vessels participating in the program are now operated
by companies based inside the United States. 96 It appears possi-
ble that U.S.-flagged ships that are held by a U.S. trust and ulti-
mately owned and operated by foreigners can participate in the
Maritime Security Fleet program.
Compared with the situation in the aviation sector, it appears
that the standards regarding ownership requirements are very
different, and much less strict, in the maritime sector. While
the DOT closely examines any links of the U.S. owners or trust-
ees of U.S. carriers with foreign interests, the Marad does not
seem to be equally interested in the ultimate ownership situa-
tion of U.S. shipping companies that receive federal subsidies.
Although the connections with the foreign owners of the U.S.
trusts that operate the vessels for the foreign owner seemed to
be obvious and well known, the Marad approved the transfer of
the subsidies to the new companies. One can assume that the
Marad, in making its decision to approve the transfer, also takes
into account the purpose of the subsidy and, in particular, the
effects a revocation of the subsidies would have on U.S.-flagged
ships and U.S. crews. Without the subsidies, the foreign buyer
of the shipping companies would have no incentive to maintain
them under the U.S. flag or to employ U.S. crews. Conse-
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quently, it appears as if Marad views the ownership status of a
shipping company and potential foreign interests in the com-
pany as less important than the continuing maintenance of a
U.S.-flagged and U.S.-crewed shipping line-with whatever ben-
efits to the U.S. economy and U.S. national security are pro-
vided by such "hybrid" owned companies.
4. Conclusion
Despite the positive influence of the Maritime Security Pro-
gram, the decline in the U.S.-flagged merchant marine fleet has
continued. Due to the high costs of U.S. labor, especially in
comparison with flag of convenience crews, and the burden-
some U.S. tax regime, the U.S.-flagged shipping fleet cannot sur-
vive without federal operating subsidies.197 The major factors
identified as to responsible for the ongoing decline of U.S.-
owned and flagged ships is the high cost of operating ships that
must comply with U.S. laws. 9 ' Ownership requirements, how-
ever, do not have the same impact on the U.S. maritime industry
as they have on the aviation industry. While ownership and con-
trol requirements in the aviation sector, due to the bilateral re-
gime, prevent or at least impede cross-border mergers of air
carriers, the sale of U.S. shipping companies to foreign shipping
lines itself is not affected by statutory ownership requirements.
However, the ownership issue is of importance in the context of
the domestic trade-which is, however, irrelevant for shipping
lines that operate in the international trade (such as the compa-
nies named above) and in the context of the subsidies granted
by the 1996 Maritime Security Act.
197 Peter Tirschwell, The Missing Rationale for US-Flag Shipping, J. OF COM., Nov.
5, 1999, at EP.
198 Tim Sansbury, Fading Future for the US-Controlled Fleet, J.OF COM., Jan. 18,
2000, at SPEC.
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